Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 4

Article 8

April 2014

Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc.:
Alabama Attempts to Spread the Nation's
Hazardous Waste Disposal Burden by Imposing a
Higher Tax on Out-of-State Hazardous Waste
Kenneth G. Cole

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kenneth G. Cole, Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc.: Alabama Attempts to Spread the Nation's Hazardous Waste Disposal Burden
by Imposing a Higher Tax on Out-of-State Hazardous Waste, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1215 (1992).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol67/iss4/8

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Comments

Hunt v. Chemical Waste Managemen4 Inc.: Alabama
Attempts to Spread the Nation's Hazardous Waste
Disposal Burden by Imposing a Higher Tax on
Out-of-State Hazardous Waste
I.

INTRODUCTION

An increasing number of states are enacting legislation 1 that
.effectively reduces the volume of hazardous waste' imported from
out-of-state sources. Ultimately, these states hope to equitably distribute the nation's hazardous waste problem among all the
states.- Since Congress has not authorized states to enact such

1 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-3011-2 (1990) (additional disposal tax of $72 imposed on
out-of-state hazardous waste disposed in Alabama); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2193(E)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1992) (prohibiting land disposal of hazardous waste after June 1991,
but allowing exceptions depending on economic and environmental alternatives); N.Y.
ENvrL CONSERV. LAw § 27-0908 (McKinney Supp. 1992) (ban on out-of-state hazardous
waste unless out-of-state generator has reciprocal waste minimization program as stringent
as New York's); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-295.01(b)(1) (1991) (requiring dilution of point
source discharges from commercial hazardous waste management facility to extent that
opening land disposal facility becomes economically unfeasible); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-5660 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (placing cap on hazardous waste, with preference for instate hazardous waste over out-of-state waste, disposed in landfills located in South Carolina).
For a general discussion of state strategies to control hazardous waste, see B.J.
Wynne, III & Terri Hamby, Interstate Waste: A Key Issue in Resolving the National Hazardous
Waste Capaciy Crisis, 32 S. TEX. LJ. '601, 629-38 (1991).
2 Congress has defined "hazardous waste" as:
a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or
otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
3 See, eg., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781,
785-87 (4th Cir. 1991) (state instituted measures that substantially limited importation of
out-of-state hazardous waste); Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d
1367, 1388-90 (Ala. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992); Chemical Waste
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parochial measures,4 federal courts have overwhelmingly struck
down, as a violation of the Commerce Clause, 5 initial state attempts to protect themselves from the dangers of hazardous waste
by limiting its importation.6
Management's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7, Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992) (No. 91-471)
(Alabama's Governor Hunt stating that no more environmental bargains will be found in
Alabama after signing into law a statute that raised dumping fees from $6 per ton to
$112 per ton on out-of-state hazardous waste); State Battles Brew Over Burden-Sharing; Waste
Management '90 Special Report, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Dec. 10, 1990, at SR12 (noting

that California, since the mid-1980s, has discouraged hazardous waste imports by imposing
a disposal fee of over $100 on all hazardous waste and establishing stringent treatment
regulations) [hereinafter Battles Brew].
4

See infra part V.B.

5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause's limitation on
state regulatory power, see infra part III.
6

See e.g., Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, 945 F.2d at 795 (preliminary injunction

prohibiting state from enforcing statute that would effectively ban out-of-state hazardous
waste upheld); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of EnvtI. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (llth Cir. 1990) (invalidating Alabama's selective ban on out-ofstate hazardous waste), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800
(1991); Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978) (striking down reciprocity
requirement before permitting importation of out-of-state industrial waste); Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142, 1144 (M.D. La. 1991) (ban on
importation of foreign generated hazardous waste struck down); cf Washington State
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (invalidating
state ban on importation of out-of-state generated low level radioactive waste), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 913 (1983); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982) (state
ban on importation of spent nuclear fuel violated Commerce Clause), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983).
Federal courts have also consistently struck down facially discriminatory state statutes
that limit the importation of solid waste. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978); National Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (differential fee on solid waste that taxed out-of-state solid waste three
times more than in-state waste dumped in Ohio's landfills invalidated on summary judgement), rev'd, No. 91-3466, 1992 WL 38147 (6th Cir. March 4, 1992) (returned to lower
court for evidentiary hearing to determine whether inspection costs serve as a compelling
state interest); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739
(S.D. Ind. 1990) (differential fee designed to prolong life of Indiana's landfills and reduce volume of hazardous waste dumped in sanitary landfills violated Commerce Clause
because other nondiscriminatory means were available). But see Bill Kettlewell Excavating,
Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991) (upholding
Michigan law granting each county the discretion to accept or deny importation of solid
waste generated outside the county; out-of-state and out-of-county waste treated similarly),
cert. granted sub. noa., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992); Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist.,
820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (ban upheld because of compelling interest in preserving
life of near-exhausted landfill life until new site located); Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth, 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985) (state waste management plan
requiring waste generated in Delaware to be disposed within State); Al Turi Landfill, Inc.
v. Town of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (surcharge on out-of-state waste upheld because bears a reasonable relationship 'to State's cost of administering program),
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The State of Alabama, in an effort to avoid becoming the
nation's dumping ground, recently instituted a hazardous waste tax
system that imposes a higher disposal tax on out-of-state hazardous
waste.7 In 1989, before the enactment of the additional disposal
tax, 40,000 truckloads of hazardous waste entered Chemical Waste
Management's' hazardous waste land disposal facility in Emelle,
Alabama (Emelle); 36,000 to 38,000 truckloads originated outside
the State.9 Alabama's disposal tax scheme has cost Chemical
Waste Management over $34 million since its enactment, resulting
in a battle between the State and the waste disposal facility.'"
This battle typifies the hazardous waste issue at the forefront of
America's environmental debate."
afd, 697 F.2d 287 (1982).
7 ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2(b) (1990). Other states also impose a higher disposal tax
on out-of-state generated hazardous waste, although not to the extent that Alabama does.
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1319-I (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (taxing carriers
that transport out-of-state hazardous waste twice the rate imposed on transportation of instate hazardous waste); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-56-170 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991)
(out-of-state hazardous waste taxed $30 per ton while in-state taxed $25 per ton); TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.136 (West Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-118
(1991) (out-of-state hazardous waste taxed at $20 per ton while in-state waste taxed $8
per ton).
8 Chemical Waste Management owns and operates Alabama's only commercial hazardous waste disposal facility. This facility is located in Emelle, Alabama.
9 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1375 (Ala. 1991),
rt. granted 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
10 Chemical Waste Management's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Chemical Waste
(No. 91-471).
11 The hazardous waste controversy has been characterized as a "civil war." Jonathon
R. Stone, Supremacy and Commerce Clause Issues Regarding State Hazardous Waste Import Bans,
15 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 1, 1-5 (1990). The battle focuses on the approximately 3.1 million tons of hazardous waste shipped in interstate commerce each year. W. VICTORIA
BECKER, NATIONAL GOVERNORS' AS'N, LEGAL IssuEs AFFECTING INTERSTATE DISPOSAL 3
(1989). In total, the United States generates approximately 271,000,000 tons of hazardous
waste each year. Id (figures from 1985 EPA report) (citation omitted). The average state
sends its waste to 19 other states for waste management services. Solid Waste: Governors'
Panel Reject Management Policy; Controversy Continues Over Interstate Shipping, 22 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2332 (Feb. 7, 1992) (quoting Pat Payne, President of Chemical Waste Management, Inc.) [hereinafter Controversy Continues]. In 1989, 13 states were net importers of
hazardous waste and 37 states were net exporters. 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2356 (Feb. 7,
1992) (listing the hazardous waste import/export status from each state based on National Governors' Association data from 1989). Alabama, Louisiana, Ohio, Indiana, and South
Carolina were the top five net importers, importing a combined total of over 800,000 net
tons. Id. Washington, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania were the top three net exporters, exporting a combined total of over 350,000 net tons. Id.
Only twenty commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities currently operate in
the United States. See Andrew Loesel, Border Battles: States Are Hoping to Gain Greater Control of Waste Crossing Their Borders, and Congress May Be Willing to Let Them, Waste Management '91, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Nov. 18, 1991, at SR7; Jeffrey D. Smith, Hazardous
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Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc.12 demonstrates the
growing hazardous waste conflict between the free trade ideal
espoused by the Commerce Clause"3 and the states' power to
protect its citizens and environment. In Chemical Waste, the Alabama Supreme Court analyzed a differential fee statute that requires commercial hazardous waste land disposal operators to pay
the State a greater fee, than that imposed on in-state hazardous
waste, for disposing out-of-state generated hazardous waste in Alabama. 4 Chemical Waste Management, Alabama's only commercial hazardous waste facility operator, filed for declaratory relief
arguing that the higher disposal tax on out-of-state hazardous
waste (Additional Fee) violated the Commerce Clause. 5 The
State, in opposition, claimed that the fee was necessary to equalize

Waste Landfills 1991: Operators Plan For Leaner Times, ENVrL. INFO. DIGESr, Feb. 1991, at 3,
6-7 (20 landfills located in 15 states: Alabama, California (3), Idaho, Illinois (2), Indiana,
Louisiana (2), Michigan, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
Texas (2), Utah). Many state leaders are reluctant to site more hazardous waste disposal
facilities within their state because of political pressure from their constituents. For example, Massachusetts, over a 10 year span, has rejected six proposals from Clean Harbors
Co. for building a hazardous waste incinerator. Elizabeth Ross, 'mporter' States Rebel
Against Hazardous Waste, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MoNIToR, Oct. 25, 1990, at 7. Also, because of intense local political pressure, Arizona recently closed down a hazardous waste
treatment facility after construction had already begun. Alice Naude, PoliticalFootball: Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Plant Sites '91, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., July 8, 1991, at SR18.
This pressure is commonly referred to as the "not-in-my-backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome.
See, e-g., William L Andreen, Defuiang the "Not in My Back Yard" Syndrome: An Approach to
Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB Disposal Facilities, 63
N.C. L. REV. 811 (1985) (discussing local governments' actions to block siting new
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) disposal facilities); Sarah Crim, The NIMBY Syndrome in
the 1990s: Where Do You Go After Getting to "No"?, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 132, 133 (May 4,
1990); Naude, supra, at SR18 (hurdles to siting hazardous waste facilities more often
politically based than environmentally based); Not in My Backyard, TIME, March 4, 1991, at
53 (Texas' temporary ban on development of new commercial disposal sites related to
objections of local communities).
Congress has attempted to alleviate the NIMBY syndrome by enacting SARA,
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, § 104(k), 42 U.S.C. §
9604(c)(9) (1988), that requires each state to ensure adequate capacity for all hazardous
waste generated in that state for the next 20 years. Id.; see infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text. Recently, several members of Congress have also introduced bills that would
allow states to impose differential fees and/or ban the importation of out-of-state hazardous waste. See, eg., S. 976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (creating Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of 1991); S. 592, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R.
3235, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
12 584 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1991), ceyt granted, 112 S. Ct 964 (1992).
13 For a discussion of the Commerce Clause, see infra part III.
14 Chemical Waste; So. 2d at 1386-90. For a discussion of Alabama's statute, see infra
notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
15 Chemical Waste, So. 2d at 1369-70.
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the burden this waste was placing on Alabama. 6 The Alabama
trial court, ruling in favor of Chemical Waste Management, held
that the Additional Fee violated the Commerce Clause because the
provision discriminated against out-of-state hazardous waste based
solely on the waste's state of origin. 7 On appeal, the Alabama
Supreme Court reversed and upheld the Additional Fee because it
served a legitimate local purpose which could not be served by
any alternative nondiscriminatory means.18 Chemical Waste Management then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari to review the Alabama Supreme Court's decision.
The Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Additional Fee
disposal tax violates the Commerce Clause
because it only applies
9
to waste generated outside Alabama.1
Part II of this Comment explains the regulatory framework
designed to minimize the risks of hazardous waste. Part III provides an overview of Commerce Clause doctrine and its limit on
state regulatory measures which interfere with interstate commerce. Part IV discusses the factual framework in which the Alabama Supreme Court analyzed Alabama's Additional Fee and, also,
outlines the Alabama court's analysis in upholding the Additional
Fee. Part V initially determines that hazardous waste is an article
of commerce subject to Commerce Clause protection. This Part
examines the Additional Fee in light of the federal regulatory

16 Id. at 1388-90; see ALA. CODE § 22-30B-1.1(8) (1990).
17 Chemical Waste Management's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Chemical
Waste (No. 91-471).
18 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1390 (Ala. 1991),
cert. grante4 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
Chemical Waste Managemeni also challenged two other provisions enacted with the
Additional Fee. Alabama imposed a uniform tax and a cap on all hazardous waste disposed in Alabama. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. Chemical Waste Management argued that the uniform tax violated the Commerce, Equal Protection, and Due
Process Clauses. Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1376-80. The Alabama Supreme Court
upheld the uniform tax against these challenges. For a brief discussion of the court's
Commerce Clause analysis, see infra note 129. They also argued that placing a cap on
the volume of hazardous waste permitted to be disposed in commercial landfills in Alabama violated the Commerce, Supremacy, Takings, and Due Process Clauses, but the
Alabama Supreme Court upheld the Alabama law against these challenges. Chemical Waste,
584 So. 2d at 1380-85. For a brief discussion of the court's Commerce Clause analysis,
see infra note 255.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari only to review the constitutionality of Alabama's Additional Fee provision. This Comment, therefore, will only
address the Commerce Clause issues surrounding this law.
19 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1991), celt.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
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framework and concludes that Congress does not authorize states
to impede the interstate flow of hazardous waste by imposing an
additional disposal tax on out-of-state waste. Part V also analyzes
the Additional Fee to determine whether it complies with the
Commerce Clause limitation on state regulatory power. After applying a strict scrutiny review to Alabama's facially discriminatory
law, Part V concludes that Alabama's higher disposal tax on out-ofstate hazardous waste violates the Commerce Clause. Because states
housing hazardous waste land disposal facilities cannot rely on
additional disposal taxes to equalize the financial burden among
all the states, Part VI advocates congressional action. After analyzing the federal and state interests involved, this Part proposes a
uniform tax on all hazardous waste generators disposing waste in
land disposal facilities.
II.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE

In an exercise of cooperative federalism," federal and state
regulations establish a comprehensive, "cradle-to-grave"2 1 regulatory scheme designed to ensure that hazardous wastes are handled
and disposed in a safe and environmentally sound manner. In
1976, Congress entered the field of hazardous waste regulation by
enacting the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) .22
RCRA set standards for hazardous waste generators and hazardous
waste treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities.2"
The primary objectives of RCRA include:
[(1)] assuring that hazardous waste management practices are
conducted in a manner which protects human health and the
environment; [(2)] requiring that hazardous waste be properly
managed in the first instance thereby reducing the need for
corrective action at a future date; [(3)] minimizing the generation of hazardous waste by encouraging process substitution,
materials recovery, properly conducted recycling and reuse, and

20

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Chemical Waste (No. 91-471).

21 See, e.g., National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 722 (11th Cir. 1990), modifid, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d
1367, 1381 (Ala. 1991), cet. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992). For a general discussion of
the RCRA program, see Wynne & Hamby, supra note 1, at 603-10 (discussing various
RCRA and EPA regulations for the generation, treatment, disposal, and transportation of
hazardous waste); Karen L. Florini, Note, Issues of Federalism in Hazardous Waste Controb
Cooperation or Confusion, 6 Harv. Envtl. L Rev. 306 (1982).

22

42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988).

23

Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1381.
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treatment.

To achieve these objectives, RCRA authorizes the administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to "promulgate regulations establishing performance standards ... as may be necessary
to protect human health and the environment." 25 Under this authority, the EPA has established numerous regulations for generators and transporters of hazardous waste and owners/operators of
26
TSD facilities.
In 1984, Congress amended RCRA primarily to establish its
policy that landfilling is the least desirable method of disposing
hazardous waste.27 In the legislative history of the RCRA amendment, Congress clearly expressed this policy by stating that "land
disposal should be used only as a last resort and only under conditions which are fully protective of human health and the environment." 8 In establishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme
for land disposal of hazardous waste, Congress recognized that
simply upgrading management standards would not solve the problem.' Instead, Congress advocated reducing and eliminating the
hazard by decreasing hazardous waste generation'o and treating
the waste with the best available technology to minimize its tox8
icity. '

24 § 6902(a)(4)-(6).
25 § 6924(a). Under RCRA, the EPA's role is to prompt creation of well-managed
facilities to replace the unsafe facilities and practices of the past. BECKER, supra note 11,
at 8.
26 See genera/y Wynne & Hamby, supra note 1, at 603-10.
27 Hazardous & Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 5576, 5578. "[T]here is a growing body of evidence that land disposal of hazardous waste is not providing, and in some cases cannot provide, protection
against groundwater contamination and in many cases poses grave threats to public
health and the environment." Id.
28 1984 U.S.C.CAN. at 5615; see 42 U.S.C. § 6901(7)-(8) (1988) (codifying the policy that land disposal of hazardous waste is the least desirable method of disposal). Congress, with the 1984 Amendments, intended to convey a clear message that continued
reliance on land disposal of hazardous waste has resulted in an unacceptable risk to
human health and the environment. 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5615.
29 Id. at 5589. Fearing that continued reliance on land disposal of hazardous waste
threatens the health of Americans, members of Congress advocated placing a direct economic disincentive on land disposal of hazardous waste in RCRA. Hunt v. Chemical
Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1382 (Ala. 1991), Crt. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964
(1992) (citations omitted).
30 Fearing that failure to act would create future Superfund sites, 1984 U.S.C.CA.N.
at 5579, Congress refocuses its efforts on reducing and eliminating hazardous waste generation and using land disposal only for wastes which will not harm human health and
the environment. Id. at 5589.
31 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1988). This statute authorizes the EPA to promulgate regula-
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In addition to establishing an effective hazardous waste management system, RCRA promotes protection of public health and
the environment by "establishing a viable Federal-State partnership."12 Under RCRA, the EPA administrator may authorize states
to administer and enforce their own hazardous waste program in
place of a program run by the federal government.5 5 Within
RCRA's partnership scheme, the EPA has the task of establishing
minimal national standards for state hazardous waste management
plans.' RCRA expressly allows a state to impose more stringent
requirements than those imposed by federal regulations,5 but it
also constrains the state's power by requiring state regulations to
be consistent with federal regulations and those of its sister states. 6

tions designed to reduce the wastes' toxicity and mobility before placement in the landfill. Id. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 268 (1991).
32 42 U.S.C. § 6902(7) (1988).
33 § 6926. States obtain authorization from the EPA administrator in a three step
process: (1) pending authorization: the state assists the EPA in the administration of
RCRA's requirements; (2) interim authorization: the state, in lieu of the EPA, has authority to administer and enforce a hazardous waste program pursuant to RCRA for a period
specified by the EPA; (3) final authorization: the state has authority to run its own program indefinitely. Id. See generally 42 C.F.R. pt. 271 (1991) (listing EPA's requirements for
states to obtain authorization).
As of March 1989, the EPA has authorized 45 states to run their own RCRA programs. See BECKER, supra note 11, at 8.
34 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (1988) (hazardous waste generators); § 6923 (hazardous
waste transporters). See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 264 (1991) (listing EPA regulations for hazardous waste).
35 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988). "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements, including those
for site selection, which are more stringent than those imposed by such regulations." Id.;
see 42 C.F.R. § 271.4 (1991). But see Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir.
1986) (acknowledging that state and local governments have authority only to make
good-faith adaptations of federal policy to local conditions); Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of
San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1446 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (striking down absolute ban on
hazardous waste imports because possible cumulative effect of similar state bans would
frustrate federal programs); Stone, supra note 11, at 8-14 (analyzing federal court rulings
striking down state waste bans on basis that those bans conflict with special provisions of
RCRA and CERCLA); Wynne & Hamby, supra note 1, at 611-16 (same).
36 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988). In order to receive and maintain authority to manage its own hazardous waste program, the state must meet three "consistency" requirements. The EPA administrator can deny authorization for a state's hazardous waste program if he finds that: "(1) such State program is not equivalent to the Federal program . . . , (2) such program is not consistent with the Federal and State programs
applicable in other States, or (3) such program does not provide adequate enforcement
of compliance with the requirements of [RCRA]." Id. The EPA has promulgated consistency requirements pursuant to § 6926(b), see 42 C.F.R. § 271.4 (1991), under which a
state program may be deemed inconsistent if it unreasonably restricts the free movement
of waste across state borders to authorized waste' management facilities; prohibits the
treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste in that state without proper health and
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While Congress created RCRA to regulate hazardous waste
from its generation to ultimate disposal, Congress enacted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)"7 to cleanup current hazardous
waste sites.' To achieve this objective, Congress provides financial
responsibility standards for improper hazardous waste disposal.3 9
This trust fund, commonly referred to as "Superfund," ensures
proper cleanup of hazardous waste sites when responsible parties
fail to do so.' Federal law gives hazardous waste disposal facility
environmental justifications; or fails to comply with the federally mandated system for
tracking hazardous waste movement. BECKER, supra note 11, at 8. If the state fails to
properly administer its own hazardous waste program, the EPA Administrator may withdraw its authorization of the nonconforming state program and replace it with a federally
administered program. § 6926(e).

37 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA is designed to ensure the cleanup of
hazardous waste sites around the nation. CERCLA provides two types of cleanup actions:
remedial actions, which are long-term or permanent containment and disposal programs,

§ 9601(24), and removal efforts, which, are usually immediate or short-term actions, §
9601(23).
38

"CERCLA empowered the executive branch, in consultation with the states, to de-

termine and implement appropriate responses to the public health threat posed by the
presence of hazardous wastes in the environment." James 1L Buckley, Note, The Political
Economy of Superfund Implementation, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 875 (1986) (exploring history
of CERCLA's implementation and analyzing political context of its enforcement).
"The main purpose of CERCLA is to protect the health and environment from the
,dangers posed by inactive hazardous waste sites." Kristin M. Carter, Note, Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986: Limiting Judicial Review to the Administrative
Record in Cost Recovery Actions by the EPA, 74 CoRNELL L. REV. 1152, 1156 (1989).
39 See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 716 (11th Cir. 1990), mod/fled, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denied
111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Buckley, supra note 38, at 875; Carter, supra note 38, at 1155-57;
Robert 0. Jenkins, Note, Constitutionally Mandated Southern Hospitality- National Solid
Wastes Management Association and Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1991) (CERCLA's
main purpose is protecting public health and the environment by providing financial
assistance for cleanup of leaking hazardous waste sites) (footnote omitted).
40 In 1986, Congress recognized the ineffectiveness of CERCLAs initial financial
appropriations and enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA)
in order to increase the financial resources available for site cleanup. SARA provides the
EPA with $8.5 billion over a five-year span to clean up inoperative waste sites. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611 (1988). However, these appropriations are still grossly inefficient to cover the
estimated $100 billion cleanup cost. Carter, supra note 38, at 1155-56 (citations omitted).
The EPA currently estimates that 30 thousand sites potentially require some type of responsive action. J. Stanton Curry et al., The Tug-of-War Between RCRA and CERCLA at Contaminated Hazardous Waste Facilities, 23 ARiz. Sr. L.J. 359, 387 (1991)
Congress also enacted SARA to encourage states to overcome internal political pressures and address hazardous waste capacity issues within their own borders. Wynne &
Hamby, supra note 1, at 627. SARA requires each state to submit a proposal to the EPA
showing that the state has adequate capacity to cover its hazardous waste disposal requirements for the next twenty years. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988).
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operators responsibility for ensuring containment of the waste
within its landfill site.4' The operators must also provide financial
assurance that sufficient funds exist to cover closure costs and
post-closure care for thirty years.' In addition, CERCLA subjects
owners/operators of a hazardous waste land disposal facility, transporters, and generators of waste disposed at that facility to strict,
joint and several liability for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by a state" in the event of a release from that facility.' Also, CERCLA requires hazardous waste transporters to demonstrate sufficient financial responsibility, up to $5 million, to
cover the costs associated with remedial efforts for any spills which
may occur in transit.'
III.

COMMERCE CLAUSE/DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
FRAMEWORK LIMITS STATES' ABILITY

TO REGULATE INTERSTATE TRADE

The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce. 5 However, the Supreme Court has "long recog-

This discussion is only meant to serve as an overview of CERCLA and its objectives.
For a more intensive discussion of this topic, see generally National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d
at 716-17; Curry et al., supra, at 366-82; Stone, supra note 11; Wynne & Hamby, supra
note 1, at 626-29; Buckley, supra note 38, at 875-88; Carter, supra note 38, at 1152-60.
41 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 264.90 to .101 (1991).
42 40 C.F.R. § 264.140 to .147 (1991).
43 42 U.S.C. § 960 7 (a) (1988).
CERCLA, however, limits liability for generators and hazardous waste land disposal
operators to $50 million plus the total cost of the remedial effort. § 9607(c)(1)(D). However, if the release results from willful misconduct, willful negligence, or a violation of
applicable safety, construction, or operating standards, the person causing the release is
responsible for the total cost of response damages. § 9607(c)(2). The Act also provides
defenses to liability including acts of God, war, and exercise of due care (demonstrated
by a preponderance of the evidence). § 9607(b).
Furthermore, CERCLA empowers the government to choose which hazardous waste
sites it will cleanup and limits the government's financial assistance for these efforts to $2
million, § 9604(c)(1), unless immediate health and environmental risks are present. §
9604(c) (1)(A). Also, the State, in these remedial actions, must pay at least 10% of the
cleanup costs and future maintenance. § 9604(c)(3)(C)(i). For a more complete discussion of this system, see Curry et al., supra note 40, at 370-82.
44 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1988). Congress has also established a comprehensive hazardous waste transportation scheme. See, e.g., 49 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1819 (West Supp.

1991).
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The objective of the Commerce Clause is to promote
cooperation among the states in the area of interstate commerce. See H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949) (producers enjoy free access to all markets;
free competition protects consumers from exploitation). Otherwise, the Framers feared
that the states would continue to compete among themselves as they had under the Articles of the Confederation and as Colonies. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
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nized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers
against interstate trade."4' This Court-interpreted doctrine limiting state regulatory power over interstate commerce is commonly
known as the "negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause.47 In
reviewing state acts that interfere with interstate commerce, courts
first determine whether the item affected by the state's action is
an article of commerce protected by the Commerce Clause. 48 If
the item is an article of commerce, the court must then determine whether Congress has authorized the state to regulate interstate commerce.49 In the absence of congressional authorization,
the court must analyze the regulation under Commerce Clause
doctrine. Courts recognize, though, that the Commerce Clause
does not present an absolute bar to state regulations ° Rather,

325-26 (1979); H.P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 533-34; Baldwin v. GA.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
522 (1935); see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L REV. 1091, 1125 (1986) (arguing that disabling
states from regulating among themselves was purpose behind granting Congress commerce power).
46 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers,
Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)); see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69,
87 (1987); H.P. Hood, 336 U.S. at 537-38 (Nation is one economic unit); G.A.F. Seelig,
294 U.S. at 527 (state may not place itself in a position of economic isolation).
47 The dormant Commerce Clause cannot be found in the Constitution's text. Instead, it has gradually emerged through judicial interpretation. See City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) ("The bounds of [the dormant Commerce
Clause's] restraint[] appear nowhere in the words of the Commerce Clause, but have
emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving effect to its basic purpose.");
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (firmly establishing doctrine
in Court's commerce jurisprudence); see also Richard C. Collins, Economic Union As a
Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 47-60 (1988); Regan, supra note 45; Robert A.
Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause As a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An
Analysis In Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 885 (1985).
Commentators and Supreme Court Justices alike have criticized the constitutional
foundation of the doctrine. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 95
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Court not suited to perform balancing analysis); Martin
H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance
of Federallsr, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569 (advocating elimination of dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine because Constitution does not support it textually and it upsets Constitution's
structure for allocating power between federal and state governments).
The doctrine has also been applied in a chaotic and confused fashion since its
inception. Jenkins, supra note 39, at 1009 nn.57-58; see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways
Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (negative side of Commerce
Clause remains hopelessly confused).
48 For a discussion of this analysis as it pertains to hazardous waste, see infra part
V.49 For a discussion of this analysis as it pertains to hazardous waste, see infra part
V.B.
50 See, eg., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 349
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courts balance the competing state and federal interests. Using
this balancing approach, courts will allow state regulations, legitimately enacted under the state's inherent police power, to stand
as long as the acts remain within the constraints of the Commerce
Clause.-'
As noted, initially, the court must determine whether the item
affected by the state measure is an article of commerce within the
meaning of the Commerce Clause. In City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey,5 2 the Supreme Court established a broad scope of Commerce Clause protection by stating that "[a]ll objects of interstate
trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by
definition at the outset.""a In concluding that solid and liquid
waste disposal merits protection,' 4 the Court rejected the New
Jersey Supreme Court's reliance 55 on an earlier opinion, Bowman
v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway,' in which the Court concluded
that innately harmful articles "are not legitimate subjects of trade
or commerce." 7 The Bowman Court included in this category
items "which, on account of their existing condition, would bring.
in and spread disease, pestilence, and death, such as rags or other

(1987); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) ("[I]n the absence of conflicting
legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing
matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce
or even, to some extent, regulate it.") (citation omitted).
51 See, eg., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978); City of
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 623.
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine has been applied by the Supreme Court
to invalidate state statutes deemed inappropriate burdens on interstate commerce.
Jenkins, supra note 39, at 1008 & n.56. See generally Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant
Commerce Clause in Its First Centuiy, 13 U. DAYrON L. REv. 417, 418 (1988) (Court has
used dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate state reciprocity requirements for export of
groundwater, state liquor tax that excluded certain locally produced alcoholic beverages,
and state restriction on export of hydroelectric power.).
52 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
53 Id. at 622.
54 Id. at 621-23.
55 The Supreme Court of the United States also rejected the New Jersey Supreme
Court's two-tier definition of "commerce." Id. With its two-tier scheme, the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to reconcile modern Commerce Clause concepts with several old
Court cases allowing states to prohibit the importation of inherently harmful objects. Id.
When the Commerce Clause is relied on to support a federal regulation, the state court
defined commerce very broadly. Id. at 621. However, the court defined commerce very
narrowly when relied on to strike down or restrict a state regulation. Id. Under this
scheme, the New Jersey Supreme Court characterized solid waste as "valueless," and,
therefore, it was not an article of interstate commerce. Id.
56 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
57 City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 622 (quoting Bowman, 125 U.S. at 489).
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substances infected with the germs of yellow fever ... or cattle or
meat or other provisions that are diseased or decayed . . . or oth-

erwise ... unfit for human use or consumption.""8 However, according to City of Philadelphia, Bowman simply holds that "because
the" articles' worth in interstate commerce was far outweighed by
the dangers inhering in their very movement, States could prohibit
their transportation across state lines."5 9 Therefore, the Court
broadly defined the category of "articles" that the Commerce
Clause protects,' yet recognized an exception in which states can
regulate commerce when the article's potential harm outweighs its
value in interstate trade.6"
If the item is an article of commerce, Congress has the power, under the Commerce Clause, to authorize state action which
would otherwise violate the Clause's underlying ideal of economic
unity.62 However, removing a state law from Commerce Clause
scrutiny requires a clear and manifest intent by Congress to authorize the state's act.' In reviewing state laws that interfere with

58 I& (quoting Bouwan, 125 U.S. at 489); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 525 (1935).
59 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622; see Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206,
214 (7th Cir. 1982) (state ban on importation of diseased cattle not enacted for affection
to local diseased cattle, but hostility is to thing itself regardless of its origin), cert. denie.d
461 U.S. 913 (1983).
60 See, eg., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (investment advisory
services); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (minnows); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (solid and liquid wastes); Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (apples).
61 See, eg., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding state import ban on
live baitfish because of its potential environmental threat to Maine's ecological system);
Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 442 (1939) (ban on interstate transportation of large
dead animals for sanitary purposes with only incidental impact on interstate commerce);
Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (dangerous and noxious subjects do
not fall within Commerce Clause's protection).
62 See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1984) (Congress may redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce by permitting the
states to regulate commerce in a manner which would not otherwise be permissible)
(citations omitted); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc. 460 U.S.
204, 213 (1983) ("Where state or local government action is specifically authorized by
Congress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it interferes with interstate
commerce.") (citations omitted); see also National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 721 (11th Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d
1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
63 The policies underlying the Commerce Clause require Congress to affirmatively
contemplate otherwise invalid legislation. South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91-92. The Commerce Clause protects unrepresented interests that bear the brunt of a state's regulations.
A rule requiring clear expression by Congress ensures that a collective decision has been
made that significantly reduces the risks that unrepresented interests will be adversely
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interstate commerce, the Court requires congressional authorization to be "expressly stated" or "unmistakably clear" before it will
allow the state action to stand. 4 The Court also recognizes implied congressional authority for state acts that discriminate against
interstate trade. In order for the Court to find implied authority,
it requires that federal policy be "so clearly delineated that a state
may enact a parallel policy without congressional approval, even if
the purpose and effect of the state law is to favor local interests." 6

In the absence of congressional authorization, the Court has
articulated a balancing approach to analyzing state regulatory measures that interfere with the free interstate trade of articles of
commerce.' Recognizing that the Commerce Clause does not
bar all state regulatory measures, the Court weighs the federal
interest in maintaining a national common market against the

affected by local restrictions on commerce. Id. at 92.
64 See South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91; White 460 U.S. at 212-13; see also Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 792 (4th Cir. 1991);
National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 721.
65 South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 88 (quoting lower court's opinion South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also Whi
460
U.S. at 213, 215 (Mayor of Boston executive order requiring city funded construction
projects to hire at least 50% Boston residents affirmatively sanctioned by and in harmony
with federal legislation). See generally Jenkins, supra note 39, at 1032-34.
66 See, eg., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350
(1977) ("[W]hen [state legislation furthering matters of legitimate local concern] comes
into conflict with the Commerce Clause's overriding requirement of a national 'common
market,' we are confronted with the task of effecting an accommodation of the competing national and local interests."); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366,
370-72 (1976) (balance legitimate local interest and "overriding requirement of freedom
for the national commerce") (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1947)); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (articulating modern Court's balancing
test).
Commentators argue that the Court, in practice, is not following its articulated
balancing approach. See Regan, supra note 45, at 1092; Seder, supra note 47, at 964-68.
Instead, the Court focuses on whether or not the state act discriminates against interstate
commerce. Regan, supra, at 1092 (court is primarily concerned with purposeful economic
protectionism); Sedler, supra, at 965 (Court follows nondiscrimination principle).
According to Professor Regan, the Court is attempting to prevent state protectionism with its central line of dormant Commerce Clause cases, the "movement of goods"
cases. Regan, supra note 45, at 1099. These cases are: Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Exxon
Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Breard
v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. GA.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
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state's local interests. 7 The Court's opinions suggest that it applies a different level of scrutiny depending on the nature of the act.6
67 The Court's dormant Commerce Clause opinions have consistently "reflected an
alertness to the evils of 'economic isolation' and protectionism, while at the same time
recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be unavoidable when a
State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of its people." City of Philadelphia, 437
U.S. at 623-24.
68 See Kalen, supra note 51, at 417; Bruce H. Aber, Note, State Regulation of Out-ofState Garbage Suject To Dormant Commerce Clause Review and the Market ParticipantException,
1 FORDHAM ENvrL. L. REP. 99, 105-08 (1989); Jenkins, supra note 39, at 1009-10.
A state may remove its actions from Commerce Clause scrutiny if the state acts as a
market participant and not as a market regulator. The Court initially developed this
"market-participant" doctrine in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976),
when it upheld a Maryland program designed to encourage the recycling of Marylandtitled abandoned cars. Id. at 815-17. When the State modified the program so that it
benefitted in-state processors, Alexandria Scrap filed suit claiming that Maryland's law
violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 800-01. Concluding that Maryland was acting as a
market participant, the Court held that the Commerce Clause did not prohibit a state
from participating in the market and, in this role, favoring its own citizens over others.
Id. at 810.
The Court expanded the doctrine in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). In
Reeves, the Court addressed the question of whether South Dakota could limit, during
times of shortage, the sale of cement produced at a State-owned facility to South Dakota
residents. Id. at 432-33. The Court upheld the State's selective sale program because
South Dakota was acting as a market participant. Id. at 446-47.
However, the Supreme Court, in South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1984), demonstrated that the extent of a state's regulatory power is limited
under this doctrine. The Court, in South-Central Timber, invalidated an Alaskan law requiring buyers of state-owned timber to process that timber in Alaska. Id. at 84. The Courtfound that Alaska was a participant in the "timber" market, but not in the "timber-processing" market. Id. at 95. The market-participant doctrine, according to the Court, only
allows a state "to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further." Id. at 97.
With respect to waste disposal, the Supreme Court has not recognized the marketparticipant doctrine as a method of limiting out-of-state waste. In City of Philadelphia, the
Court declined to express an opinion about "New Jersey's power, consistent with the
Commerce Clause, to restrict state residents access to state-owned resources; or New
Jersey's power to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents and businesses."
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 n.6 (citations omitted).
In response, several federal and state courts, using the market-participant doctrine,
have upheld state regulations limiting the disposal of solid waste at state-owned facilities.
See Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.RI. 1987) (upholding state ban on
out-of-state solid waste at state-subsidized facility); Shayne Bros. v. District of Columbia,
592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984) (upholding health regulation prohibiting disposal of
solid waste generated outside of the city at District operated disposal facilities); County
Comm'rs of Charles County v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12 (Md. 1984) (upholding county ban
on out-of-state solid waste at county-owned landfill); see also, Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987) (ban on solid waste originating
outside 3-county area did not violate Commerce Clause because it regulated evenhandedly
and served legitimate local purpose with only incidental burden on interstate commerce).
For a more detailed discussion of the market-participant doctrine as it pertains to
solid waste disposal, see Aber, supra; Jonathon P. Meyers, Note, Confronting the Garbage
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If the statute regulates evenhandedly, the Court has adopted a
more flexible approach to analyzing the competing interests.6
The Court will uphold a state regulation "[w]here the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental."70 However, the burden imposed on commerce must not be
"clearly excessive" in relation to the regulation's putative local
71
benefits.
In contrast to the flexible review given nondiscriminatory state
regulatory measures, the Court strictly scrutinizes state measures
that discriminate against interstate trade on its face, in purpose, or
in effect. 72 For the court to uphold the discriminatory measure,

the state must show that (1) the measure serves a legitimate local
purpose that (2) cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.73 However, the Court has set a "high"
standard that a state must overcome in justifying its action. Effectively, this standard demonstrates the Court's attempt to balance
74
the nondiscriminatory ideal embodied in the Commerce Clause

Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement As a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal,
79 GEo. LJ. 567 (1991); David Pomper, Comment, Recyding Philadelphia v. New Jersey
The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Ciis,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1989).
69 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960); see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 47074 (1981) (using balancing approach to uphold evenhanded law prohibiting milk retailers
from selling their products in plastic, nonreturnable bottles).
70 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
71 Id. The Pike Court also noted that once a legitimate local interest has been
found, the "clearly excessive" standard becomes one of degree which depends on the
type of interest involved and whether the state could promote the local interest with a
less discriminatory measure. Id. In Pike, the Court struck down, as a violation of the
Commerce Clause, an Arizona law which required Arizona-grown cantaloupes to be packaged and labeled within the state. Id. at 146.
72 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (recognizing that state statute
can discriminate against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect); Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471 n.15 (recognizing that state statute can discriminate in effect or
purpose); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (facially discriminatory); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (discriminatory on its face); Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (discriminatory in
effect).
73 New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); Taylor, 477
U.S. at 138, 151; Sporhase v. Nebraska e rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 946, 958 (1982); Hughes,
441 U.S. at 336-37.
74 Collins, supra note 47, at 109 (primary purpose of Commerce Clause is to promote economic integration and interstate harmony); Sedler, supra note 47, at 893 (Commerce Clause embodies nondiscrimination principle).
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against the legitimate, local interests of the state, with the scales
weighted heavily against the state. 75
In City of Philadelphia,the Court demonstrated its position that
state measures which discriminate unnecessarily against interstate
trade are virtually per se unconstitutional. 76 In this case, the Court
struck down a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation of solid
or liquid wastes generated outside New Jersey.77 The State argued
that it designed the ban to protect its citizens and environment
from the dangers inherent in solid waste78 and rejected the appellants contention that it instituted the ban for economic and
financial reasons.79 The Court assumed that New Jersey had legitimate interests in protecting "its residents' pocketbooks as well as
their environment," ° but stated that the "evil of protectionism
can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.""
In analyzing New Jersey's ban, the City of Philadelphia Court
stated that the nondiscrimination principle does not permit a state
to accomplish its legitimate objectives "by discriminating against

75 In New Energy, the Court noted that the state must overcome a "high" standard in
order to justify its action. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278; c. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at
624 ("[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually
per se rule of invalidity has been erected.); Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 ("[F]acial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect" and "[a]t a minimum . . . invokes the strictest scrutiny."). In New Energy, the Court struck down an Ohio statute that provided a tax credit
against the Ohio motor vehicle fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold by fuel
dealers, but only if the ethanol was produced in Ohio or in a state granting similar tax
advantages for Ohio-produced ethanol. New Energy, 486 U.S. at 271. The Court noted that
subsidies of domestic industry do not normally violate the Commerce Clause, but subsidies, like this one, designed to give in-state industry an advantage in the marketplace "in
connection with the State's regulation of interstate commerce" M under Commerce Clause scrutiny. Id. at 278.
76 The Court stated that "where simple economic protectionism is effected by state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected." City of Philadelphia, 437
U.S. at 624; see, eg., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) (stricter
rule of invalidity for state legislation that effects simple economic protectionism); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). According to the Court, the clearest example of economic protectionism occurs when a state law "overfly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's borders." City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
77 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629. Before analyzing the State's ban on out-ofstate waste, the Court determined that solid waste enjoys Commerce Clause protection.
Id. at 621-23.
78 Id at 626.
79 Id. at 625-26. The appellants argued that the ban would effectively extend the life
of New Jersey's landfill sites and, thus, delay the time when New Jersey would have to
transport its own solid waste outside its State. Id.
80 Id. at 626.
81 Id.
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articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there 8is2
some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently."
The Court determined that New Jersey did not have a legitimate
reason for treating solid waste generated outside New Jersey differently than in-state generated waste.' Because New Jersey had
attempted to burden out-of-state solid waste generators with the
duty of conserving New Jersey's remaining landfill space,8 the
Court concluded that the State had unconstitutionally "isolate[d]
itself from a problem common to many [states] by erecting a
barrier against the movement of interstate [solid waste]."'
In contrast, the Court in Maine v. Taylo' 6 allowed Maine to
isolate itself from out-of-state baitfish because of its uncertain ecological impact on the State. 7 Accepting the lower court's strict
scrutiny analysis,' the Supreme Court held that Maine had legitimate reasons, "apart from their origin, to treat [out-of-state
baitfish] differently." 89 The lower court determined that Maine's
objective was to prevent potential environmental threats to its
unique and fragile fisheries posed by out-of-state baitfish. The
lower court's findings indicated that out-of-state wild fish contained
parasites not natural to Maine's wild fish population and that
nonnative fish included in the baitfish shipments could upset
Maine's ecological system.91 However, the lower court did not
require Maine to demonstrate to any level of certainty that these

82 Id. at 626-27. In New Energy, the Court endorsed this rule by stating that "state
statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down,
unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism." New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (citations omitted). The New Energy Court also noted that if the state regulation discriminates against
interstate commerce, the extent of its impact is irrelevant for Commerce Clause purposes.
Id. at 275-77.
83 The Court found that the harmful health and environmental effects of the two
solid waste streams became indistinguishable after being intermixed in the landfill. City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628-29. The Court also rejected the application of the quarantine
doctrine because no claim had been made that the very movement of the waste endangers the health of New Jersey's citizens. Id.
84 Id. at 628. According to the Court, New Jersey may not "accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders." Id. at 627.
85 Id. at 628.
86 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
87 Id. at 151-52.
88 The Supreme Court applied a "clearly erroneous" standard to the district court's
ruling and factual findings. Id. at 145.
89 Id. at 152 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
90 Id. at 140-43.
91 Id. at 140-41.
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92
out-of-state elements would actually harm the environment.
Thus, by accepting the lower court's conclusion that legitimate
interests exist despite lack of concrete proof, the Court's ruling
suggests that it will more readily find a legitimate state interest
when that interest relates to environmental or health concerns. In
regard to the "nondiscriminatory alternative" prong, the Court
recognized that acceptable testing procedures could be developed
eventually, but rejected this "abstract possibility" as an available,
nondiscriminatory alternative. 3 A State, according to the Court,
"is not required to develop new and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost.' Thus, the Court accepted the district
court's factual finding that satisfactory inspection methods did not
presently exist as a less discriminatory alternative to Maine's total
ban. Once a discriminatory state measure withstands strict scrutiny,
the Commerce Clause's free trade ideal falls to the state's "broad
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens
and the integrity of its natural resources."

IV.

HUNT V. CFMlCAL WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.: ALABAMA'S
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS ADDITIONAL DISPOSAL FEE ON
OUT-OF-STATE HAZARDOUS WASTE

A.

FactualFramework of Chemical Waste
Management, Inc.

The small town of Emelle, Alabama houses one of the nation's
largest hazardous waste landfill facilities.97 During the 1980s, the

92 Id. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (possibility of ecological effects insufficient to
meet state's burden of proof; arguing that "[a]mbiguity about dangers and alternatives
should actually defeat, rather than sustain, the discriminatory measure").

93 Id. at 147. Present inspection techniques required destruction of the fish in order
to determine whether unwanted parasites were present. Id. at 141-42. Removing unwanted
species was also determined to be "physically impossible" because of the small size of the
baitfish and shipment quantities of approximately 158,000 fish. Id. at 141 & n.12.
94 Id. at 147.
95 Id. at 151.
96 Emelle is located in west-central Alabama and has a population of approximately
66 people.

RAND MCNALLY COMMERCIAL ATLAS

& MARKETING

GUmE 248 (119th

ed.

1988).
97 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1372 (Ala. 1991),
cer. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992); see National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Ala-

bama Dep't of Envti. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 715 (11th Cir. 1990), modifi4 924 F.2d
1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denie, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
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yearly volume of hazardous waste disposed at Emelle doubled to
788,000 tons of waste. 9 Because 85% to 90% of the waste permanently disposed at Emelle originated outside Alabama,'
Alabama's executive and legislative branches expressed concern
that its State was quickly becoming the nation's dumping ground
for hazardous waste."t Alabama's Legislature responded by establishing a differential fee structure under which large, commercial
hazardous waste land disposal operators paid a substantially higher
01
fee for disposing out-of-state generated waste at their facilities. '
Alabama's Legislature enacted this fee structure in order to equitably offset the permanent risks and costs to Alabama and its citizens from the disposal of out-of-state generated hazardous waste
within Alabama and encourage
generators to develop methods of
10 2
waste.
hazardous
eliminating
The Emelle facility 3 is one of only twenty commercial haz-4
ardous waste landfills currently operating in the United States.1
In 1989, the Emelle facility received approximately 17% of all the

Emelle is currently the only commercial hazardous waste land disposal facility operating in Alabama. Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1372.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. owns and operates the Emelle facility. It also has
facilities in Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, New York, and Oregon. Smith, supra note 11, at
6-7.
98 Chemical Waste 584 So. 2d at 1373 (volume of hazardous waste disposed at Emelle
in 1989). In 1985, 341,000 tons of waste were disposed at Emelle. Id.
99 Id
100 See AIA. CODE § 22-30B-1.1(1) (1990); see also National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at
717 n.6 (Alabama's Governor Hunt expressed concern that Alabama was becoming the
hazardous waste dump of the nation).
101 § 22-3011-2. See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Alabama's hazardous waste fee structure.
Alabama law defines a "commercial" hazardous waste disposal facility as a "site or facility receiving hazardous waste or hazardous substances . . . not generated on site, for
disposal and to which a fee is paid or other consideration given for such disposal." § 22SOB-1 (1).
102 § 22-30B-1.1(7)-(8).
103 Emelle currently operates under both federal and state authority. Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. has received permits to operate Emelle from the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 69016991 (1988), and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988). The,
Toxic Substances Control Act controls the disposal of PCBs and provides a more stringent regulatory framework for the management of PCB contaminated waste than would
apply under RCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1988); Wynne & Hamby, supra note 1, at 616
n.144.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. also operates under Alabama state law pursuant
to interim status authority granted under AlA. CODE § 22-30-12(i) (1990).
104 See Smith, supra note 11, at 4-5 (listing states where hazardous waste land disposal
facilities are located).
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United States' commercially landfilled hazardous waste. °5 The facility also serves as the ultimate burial ground for over one-third
of the waste shipped offsite from Superfund cleanup sites. 106 Only 8.6%, or 69,000, of the 788,000 tons of waste landfilled at
Emelle in 1989 were generated in-state. 10 7 Without any import
restrictions, Chemical Waste Management expected Emelle's yearly
hazardous waste disposal tonnage to continue increasing.0 "
The increasing volume of hazardous waste disposed at Emelle
creates potential dangers to Alabama's citizens and environment.109 The main concern is preventing leachate, a poisonous

105 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1373 (Ala. 1991),
cet granted 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
106 Chemical Waste Management Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Chemical Waste
(No. 91-471) (citing Brief for the United States at 9, National Solid Wastes Management
Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (lth Cir. 1990), modified
924 F.2d 1001 (l1th Cir.), cer denied 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991)).
107 Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1375.
108 Id. at 1373. Chemical Waste Management estimates that Emelle has capacity for
another 100 years of operation. rd.
Hazardous waste disposed at Emelle includes both hazardous and nonhazardous
waste. Generators who send nonhazardous waste to Emelle do so as a precautionary measure to avoid potential future cleanup costs if the EPA expands its definition of hazardous waste. I& At the present time, the EPA "does not know whether it has identified
10% or 90% of the existing hazardous wastes." Id. Recently, the EPA expanded its definition of hazardous waste, 40 C.F.R. §§ 261, 264, 265, 271, 302 (1991), increasing the
number of materials that must be treated as hazardous waste by four fold. See Wynne &
Hamby, supra note 1, at 602-03 n.3 (noting that Texas Water Commission expects new
regulations to increase the volume of annually generated hazardous waste from 60,000,000
tons to 180,000,000 to 240,000,000 tons).
Regardless of how the EPA defines hazardous waste, both Chemical Waste Management and the State must treat all buried waste as hazardous when determining the costs
of Emelle's continued monitoring and potential cleanup and the risks to Alabama's citizens and environment.
109 Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1373. The court noted that hazardous waste contains materials that are ignitable, corrosive, toxic, and reactive. Id. The court also stated
that landfiUing is the least desirable method of disposing hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. §
6901(b) (7) (1988) (stating the federal policy that land disposal of hazardous waste is the
least favored method for managing hazardous waste and should be minimized or eliminated); see also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. Landfilling remains popular because it is a relatively inexpensive method of hazardous waste disposal. See Jenkins, supra
note 39, at 1001 n.4. Five modem methods of treating hazardous waste are typically
used: (1) thermal treatment (using incinerators); (2) immobilization (mixing the waste,
either physically or chemically, to prevent the waste from migrating into the groundwater); (3) physical treatment (separating the waste into component waste streams); (4)
chemical treatment (altering the chemical composition of the waste so that it is no longer hazardous, or pretreating the waste to make it easier to handle); and (5) biological
treatment (using microorganisms to render potentially toxic materials harmless). Id. (citation omitted). Today, 72% of the hazardous waste generated undergoes some type of
treatment; 26% is disposed in land facilities; 1% is incinerated; and 1% is recycled. INSTI-
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liquid, from exfiltrating and poisoning the groundwater and underlying earth."' Because scientists have not yet developed an
effective scheme for preventing the exfiltration of leachate,"'
landfilling hazardous waste at Emelle creates permanent risks to
Alabama's citizens and environment." 2 In addition, the
transportation of increasing volumes of hazardous waste into, or
through, Alabama for disposal creates a greater probability of
"spills, accidents and explosions that could release toxic fumes and
contaminate the groundwater and/or surface water.""' Despite
elaborate federal and local precautions," 4 transportation of hazardous waste on Alabama's roads and the operation of Emelle
"creates unquantifiable risk or uncertainty to the public health and
5
to the environment" of Alabama."
Alabama's Legislature also expressed concern about unknown
potential dangers related to hazardous waste landfill facilities in its
State. In 1975, it established a statewide program to provide safe
management of hazardous waste." 6 In the late 1980s, the Legislature became concerned that its State was quickly becoming the
nation's hazardous waste burial ground and responded by enacting
Act No. 90-326.117 The Act imposes a "Base Fee" of $25.60 per
ton on operators of commercial hazardous waste landfill sites for

TUTE OF CHEM. WASTE MANAGEMENT, MEET THE BROWNS (hazardous waste informational

pamphlet).
110 Chemical Waste 584 So. 2d at 1373-74. Leachate is created by the seepage of
groundwater or surface water into the landfill trenches and its mixture with the hazardous waste. Id. The leachate creates a driving force behind the exfiltration of waste from
the landfill. Id. The testimony at trial indicated that leakage has already occurred and
that annually 10 to 15 million gallons of leachate and surface water are gathered, stored,
and transported from Emelle at an annual cost of $2 to $3 million. Id. at 1374.
111 Id. The EPA recognizes that the current method of impeding the migration of
hazardous waste, synthetic trench liners, does not absolutely prevent waste from
exfiltrating and will only retard migration in the tens of years time range. Id.
Emelle is situated over the Selma Group Chalk Foundation. This Foundation extends across the states of Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas. Id. The chalk has
low permeability making it potentially suitable for geological containment of hazardous
waste. Id. Leachate is already seeping through the Selma Formation, but the rate of its
travel to the uppermost aquifer is uncertain. Estimates range from 330 to 10,000 years.
Id.
112 Id. at 1375.
113 Id.
114 See 42 U.S.C. § 6923 (1988); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1801-1812 (1988). See generally Wynne & Hamby, supra note 1, at 616-18.
115 Chemical Wask 584 So. 2d at 1375.
116 Id. at 1372.
117 AL. CODE § 22-30B-1.1(1) (1990).
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all waste disposed at their site." 8 The Act also requires these operators to pay an "Additional Fee" of $72.00 per ton on all out-ofstate waste disposed at their site." 9 In conjunction with this differential tax scheme, the Act set a "Cap" on the amount of waste
"that can be disposed of at any affected facility in any one-year
period. " 1 2' The benchmark period used by the Legislature coincides with the first year of the new fee system. 21 The Legislature
enacted Act No. 90-326 primarily to (1) "encourage business and
industry to develop technology that will eliminate the generation
of hazardous waste;"'122 (2) protect the health and safety of
Alabama's citizens and its environment; 12 and (3) equitably apportion the financial burden, caused by the presence of commercial hazardous waste facilities in Alabama, between in-state and
out-of-state waste generators who dispose their waste at these facilities.

124

Act No. 90-326 also allocates the funds generated by this tax
system. It allocates a maximum of $4.2 million to the county commission in the county where the commercial hazardous waste facility is located. 12 In addition, the Act provides a maximum of
$4.5 million for Alabama's public health finance authority. 12 6 Finally, the Act gives the remaining 1 proceeds
to the State's general
27
fund for use in general operations.

118 § 22-30B-2(a).
119 § 22-30B-2(b).
120 § 22-30B-2.3. The Cap provision only applies to commercial hazardous waste land
disposal facilities that dispose over 100,000 tons of waste during the benchmark period.
Id. Emelle is the only facility that falls under Alabama's Cap provision.
121 § 22-30B-1.1(9). The Legislature linked the benchmark period and the fee structure in order to prevent the operators from artificially lowering their disposal price in
order to increase the benchmark volume. Id.
122 § 22-30B-1.1(7).
123 § 22-30B-1.1(4).
124 § 22-30B-1.1(8). For example, the Chemical Waste court notes that periodic checks
of Emelle's monitoring wells will be required forever;, the estimates for these monitoring
costs range from $100 thousand to over $1.5 million per year. Hunt v. Chemical Waste
Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1374-75 (Ala. 1991), cer. grante 112 S. Ct. 964
(1992).
125 ALA. CODE § 22-30B-2.1 (1990).
126 § 22-30B-2.2.
127 § 22-30B-3.
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Alabama Supreme Court's Analysis of the Additional Fee

In Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc.,128 Chemical Waste
Management filed suit for declaratory relief, challenging the constitutionality of Alabama's differential fee structure.'" The Alabama Supreme Court held that the Additional Fee was "a responsible exercise ...
of [Alabama's] broad regulatory authority to
protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its
natural resources."" s This ruling reversed the trial court's decision which held that Alabama's additional disposal tax on out-ofstate hazardous waste violated the Commerce Clause.
The trial court concluded that City of Philadelphiaand National
Solid Wastes Management Association v. Alabama Department of Environmental Managemen' 3 2 compelled the conclusion that the Additional Fee violates the Commerce Clause.' 33 First, the trial court
rejected the State's environmental and safety justifications for
treating hazardous waste generated outside of Alabama differently
than in-state generated hazardous waste. 34 The court stated:

128 584 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1991), eert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
129 Id. at 1369-70. In addition to challenging Alabama's Additional Fee on out-of-state
hazardous waste, Chemical Waste Management also challenged the constitutionality of the
State's Base Fee. This fee applied equally to all waste disposed at commercial land disposal facilities in Alabama. Chemical Waste Management argued that the Base Fee violated the Commerce Clause. However, the court applied the Pike balancing test and concluded that the Base Fee regulates evenhandedly, without regard to the waste's state of
origin. Id. at 1376-78. The court determined that the burden placed on interstate commerce by the Base Fee was not clearly excessive in light of its financial, safety, and environmental objectives. Id. at 1377.
130 Id. at 1389.
131 Id. at 1387.
132 910 F.2d 713 (lth Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (lth Cir.), cert. denied 111
S. Ct. 2800 (1991). In this case, the Eleventh Circuit struck down, as a violation of the
Commerce Clause, an Alabama statute that banned the importation of hazardous waste
from certain "blacklisted" states. Id. at 725. Relying heavily on City of Philadelphia, the
Eleventh Circuit found that Alabama's selective ban "distinguishe[d] among wastes based
on their origin, with no other basis for the distinction." Id. at 720. For an in-depth analysis of National Solid Wastes, see Jenkins, supra note 39 (arguing that Alabama's selective
ban did not violate Commerce Clause).
Prior to this selective ban, Alabama sought to prevent the cleanup of a Texas
Superfund site in order to prevent disposal of that waste at Emelle. Alabama v. United
States Envtl. Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548 (lth Cir.), ert. denied; 110 S. Ct. 538
(1989). The court dismissed the case on standing and jurisdictional grounds, but noted
that Alabama could not "assert injury based on the out-of-state nature of these wastes
[because] the Supreme Court has already held that the commerce clause bars such a distinction." Id. at 1555 n.3 (citation omitted).
133 Id. at 1387.
134 Chemical Waste Management's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Chemical Waste
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[H]azardous waste generated in Alabama is just as dangerous
as such waste generated in other states. All of the safety and
environmental concerns set forth at trial ... apply with equal
force to hazardous waste generated in and out of the State of
Alabama ....
This Court finds -that the record contains no
evidence of any difference between in-state waste and out-ofstate waste other than the waste's state of origin."
Second, the court rejected the State's proffered cost justification for the measure." The State argued that the Additional
Fee fairly apportions the costs associated with commercial hazardous waste disposal facilities located within Alabama between instate and out-of-state generators. According to the court, the State
failed to demonstrate that the Additional Fee equalized the financial burden between these two classes of waste generators or that
in-state generators bore a disproportionate share of these
costs. 15 7 Thus, the trial court concluded that the Additional Fee
unconstitutionally discriminated against out-of-state hazardous waste
generators. 3 s

At the beginning of its opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court
distinguished City of Philadelphiaby stating that it "does not hold
that a state may not limit importation of wastes to protect health
and the environment; it holds that a state may not do so for 'simple economic protectionism. '""' 9 According to the Alabama Supreme Court, both City of Philadelphia and National Solid Wastes

involved state measures enacted for the purpose of economic
protectionism."4 In contrast, the state supreme court concluded
that Alabama's enactment of the Additional Fee served a
noneconomic objective.14' Thus, Alabama's Supreme Court ruled
(No. 91-471).
135 Id. (quoting lower court's opinion).
136 Id. at 8.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 7.
139 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1387 (Ala. 1991),
cert. granted; 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992). The Alabama court cited Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981), as support for its interpretation of City of Philadephia. Id. at 1387-88. In fact, Clover Leaf does not support the Alabama Supreme Court's
interpretation. Clover Leaf states that "a state law constitutes 'economic protectionism' on
proof of either discriminatory effect or of discriminatory purpose." Clover Leaf, 449 U.S.
at 471 n.15 (citations omitted). Therefore, according to Clover Leaf, even if Alabama had
a legitimate purpose in enacting the Additional Fee, the fee may still constitute protectionism if its effect is discriminatory.
140 Chemical Waste 584 So. 2d at 1387.
141 Id. The Legislature's objective, according to the Alabama Supreme Court, was to
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that City of Philadelphiadid not compel a finding that the fee provision violated the Commerce Clause. 42
Instead, the Alabama Supreme Court indicated that it was

applying a strict scrutiny level of review to Alabama's Additional
Fee provision. 14 However, because of the court's narrow interpretation of City of Philadelphia, the court effectively applied a
deferential standard of review. 44 The court concluded that the
Additional Fee serves a legitimate local interest that could not be
adequately served by reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives.' 45 To reach its conclusion, the court focused primarily on
determining whether legitimate objectives existed and did not

strictly analyze whether reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives
were available.
Instead, it found that the Additional Fee served to equalize
the financial burden between in-state and out-of-state generators
and protect Alabama's citizens and environment. 46 The Court
stated that the Additional Fee served four purposes:
(1) [P]rotection of the health and safety of the citizens of
Alabama from toxic substances; (2) conservation of the environment and the state's natural resources; (3) provision for compensatory revenue for the costs and burdens that out-of-state
waste generators impose by dumping their hazardous waste in
Alabama; (4) reduction of the overall flow of wastes traveling
on the state's highways, which flow creates a great risk to the
147
health and safety of the state's citizens.

effectively "deal with health and environmental hazards to Alabamians created by hazardous waste imported [into Alabama] from other states." Id.

142 Id.
143 Id. at 1386 (citing New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278
(1988)).
144

Id. at 1387-88. The Alabama Supreme Court interprets the Supreme Court of the

United States' decisions as establishing two categories of facially discriminatory state statutes: measures that "discriminate arbitrarily against out-of-state commerce in order to give
in-state interests a commercial advantage, i.e., simple economic protectionism, and state
measures that seek to protect public health or safety or the environment." Chemical Waste,
584 So. 2d at 1587. The court relies on Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 n.19 (1986),
as authority for allowing greater deference for environmental measures than ordinary
legislative acts. Id at 1388. The court also cites Rehnquist's dissent in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629-33 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (considering
quarantine case law dispositive of state's authority to ban out-of-state solid waste), as further authority for its position. Id.
145 Id. at 1390.
146 Id. at 1389. The court also specifically found that Alabama's Legislature did not
enact the Additional Fee for the purpose of economic protectionism. Id. at 1387.
147

Id.
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To reach this conclusion, the court noted that the wastes dumped
at Emelle included known carcinogens and "extremely hazardous"
materials that can cause severe medical ailments.' In addition,
the court recognized that exfiltration of wastes from the Emelle
facility could pollute Alabama's natural resources, contaminate its
drinking water, or enter the food chain.'4 9 The court noted that
the probability of exposure from the transportation of hazardous
waste on Alabama's roads increases as the volume of waste transported on its roads increases. 150 Also, the court expressed its
concern that Alabama was quickly nearing its finite capacity for
hazardous waste because of the influx of out-of-state generated
waste.'
It characterized the Legislature's action as asking out-ofstate generators, who dispose their waste in Alabama,* to bear the
cost of increased environmental and safety risks to Alabama and
its citizens. 2 Recognizing that the risks associated with the permanently stored hazardous waste would continue forever, the court
reasoned that Alabama taxpayers will bear a disproportionate burden of the State's regulatory and monitoring costs for Emelle if it
did not uphold the Additional Fee.'
After determining that the Legislature's objectives were legitimate, the court quickly rejected two possible nondiscriminatory
alternatives. The court rejected the possibility of returning to the
status before the Additional Fee's enactment because Emelle was
quickly reaching the limit of its finite capacity. 54 The court stated that "nothing in the Commerce Clause ... compels ... Alabama to yield its total capacity for hazardous waste to other
states." 155 Apparently, the court was concerned that the volume
of waste disposed within Alabama would continue to increase dramatically without the Additional Fee measure. The court also rejected the second alternative of taxing in-state and out-of-state
waste at the same rate. The court felt that a nondiscriminatory tax
was not a viable alternative because Alabama "is bearing a grossly
148 Id. at 1389 (noting that hazardous wastes can cause birth defects, genetic damage,
blindness, crippling, and death).
149 Id. at 1373.
150 Id. at 1375.
151 Id. at 1389.
152 Id. at 1388.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1389. The Alabama Supreme Court's statement seems to contradict the
lower court's finding of fact, which the higher court approved, that Emelle has another
100 years of capacity. Id. at 1373.
155 Id.
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disproportionate share of
the burdens of hazardous waste disposal
156
for the entire country."

Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the Additional Fee serves a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives. As a
result, the court held that the Additional Fee did not violate the
Commerce Clause and the Legislature properly exercised its regulatory power by using this measure to 5 protect
Alabama's natural
7
resources and the health of its citizens.
V. ALABAMA'S ADDITIONAL FEE DOES NOT
WITHSTAND STRICT COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY
In upholding Alabama's Additional Fee provision, the Alabama Supreme Court failed to analyze the discriminatory measure
with the level of review that the Commerce Clause demands. The
Clause creates a national economic union that requires the states
to "sink or swim" together. 5 ' As an article of commerce, 5 9
hazardous waste, despite its inherent risks, enjoys Commerce
Clause protection to the same extent as other "goods" of interstate

commerce. Congress, though, can authorize states to enact measures which interfere with this ideal."6 But, Congress has not
granted the states authority to impede the interstate flow of hazardous waste.'
In
the absence of congressional authority,

156 Id.
157 Id. at 1390. Quoting almost verbatim from the Supreme Court's holding in Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986), the Alabama court held:
that the Additional Fee provision of Act No. 90-326 is not invalid under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Additional Fee does
not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to place Alabama in a position of economic isolation. It merely retains Alabama's broad regulatory authority
to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural
resources. The evidence in this case amply supports the conclusion that the
Additional Fee serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be
served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. This is not a case of arbitrary
discrimination against interstate commerce; the record suggests that Alabama has
legitimate reasons, apart from their origin, to treat out-of-state wastes differently.
Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1390.
158 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935). The full quote reads:
"[The Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in
union and not division." Id.
159 See infra notes part V.A.
160 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
161 See infra part V.B.
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Alabama's discriminatory measure is subject to Commerce Clause
review. Alabama's measure does not withstand a proper strict scrutiny review; reasonable alternatives to the Additional Fee exist
which attain the Legislature's objective of protecting Alabama's
citizens and environment as well as equitably distributing the
facility's financial burden. 6 2 At the same time, these reasonable
alternatives prevent Alabama from effectively "weighing down" the
safe, efficient disposal of the nation's hazardous waste.
A.

Hazardous Waste Qualifies as an Article of Commerce

To determine whether Alabama's Additional Fee is unconstitutional, one must initially determine whether hazardous waste is an
article of commerce subject to Commerce Clause protection. In
Chemical Waste, the Alabama Supreme Court questions whether
hazardous waste falls within the scope of "commerce" defined by
the Commerce Clause. 6 ' Although the Supreme Court of the
United States has not expressly concluded that the Commerce
Clause protects hazardous waste as an article of commerce, federal
judicial decisions strongly suggest that the traditional interpretation of "commerce" does include hazardous waste.
In analyzing the extent of the Commerce Clause's protection,
City of Philadelphia,focusing on the transportation and disposal of
solid waste, suggests that articles of commerce include all waste
types.164 However, the transportation and disposal of hazardous
waste contains significantfy greater risks to human health and the
environment. Scientists recognize that hazardous waste contains
"poisonous chemicals that can cause cancer, birth defects, genetic
damage, blindness, crippling, and death." 65 Looking -solely at
hazardous waste and its known dangers, it seems to fall within the
Bowman quarantine exception as defined in City of Philadelphia.166
Despite its potential for causing significant harm, the Eleventh
Circuit, in National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Alabama

162

See infra part V.C.

163 The Alabama Supreme Court assumed that hazardous waste was an article of commerce for the purposes of its analysis. Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584

So. 2d 1367, 1387 (Ala. 1991), cert. grante, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992). Justice Houston, in a
concurring opinion, expressed that the Commerce Clause should not protect hazardous
waste as an article of commerce. Id. at 1390-91 (Houston, J., concurring).
164 See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
165 Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1389; see also National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 71819.
166 For a discussion of this exception, see supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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"7
explicitly held that
Department of Environmental Management,16
hazardous waste is an article of interstate commerce, falling under
the Commerce Clause's protection."6 To reach its conclusion,
the court determined that the quarantine exception did not apply
because the "dangers associated with hazardous waste movement
do not outweigh the value of moving hazardous waste across state
lines." 69 Congress' comprehensive hazardous waste regulatory
scheme played a key role in the court's decision. According to the
court, hazardous waste only causes health risks when improperly
treated, stored, transported, or disposed.' 70 The court suggests
that improper handling of hazardous waste will occur infrequently
7
due to the comprehensive regulatory scheme in place.' '
While a comprehensive regulatory scheme reduces its potential dangers, hazardous waste plays a substantial role in interstate
commerce. Efficient, safe, and inexpensive disposal of hazardous
waste is essential for competitive trade in the primary product's
market, as well as the landfill services market. 7 A recent federal
circuit court acknowledged the role of waste disposal in interstate
trade: "The efficient disposal of wastes is as much a part of economic activity as the production that yields the wastes as a byprodThe sale price of the primary product includes
uct . ...
"'7

167 910 F.2d 713 (l1th Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), met. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
168

National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 718-19; see also Hazardous Waste Treatment

Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 790 n.13 (4th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with Eleventh Circuit's ruling in National Solid Wastes); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142, 1148-49 (M.D. La. 1991) (same); cf. Washington State Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1982), cet. denie, 461
U.S. 913 (1983) (low-level radioactive waste); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206,
213-14 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (nuclear waste); Hardage v.
Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 1978) (controlled industrial waste).
169

National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 719.

170 Id. (interpreting Congress' hazardous waste definition in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)
(1988)). For the text of Congress' definition of hazardous waste, see supra note 2.
171

National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 719. The scheme is designed to minimize risks

to the public and environment by requiring waste generators, transporters, and managers
to strictly comply with these regulations. Id. For a discussion of the extent of the regulatory scheme for hazardous waste, see supra part 11.
172 In 1990, the disposal industry generated $4 billion in revenues. Not in My Backyard, TIME, March 4, 1991, at 53.

173 Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461
U.S. 913 (1983). General Electric dealt with an Illinois ban on the importation of spent
nuclear fuel for disposal at a facility located in Illinois. Id. The Seventh Circuit struck
down the measure noting that the ban did not prohibit intrastate movements of nuclear
fuel used in Illinois nor did it prohibit the transportation of fuel through Illinois for
disposal in another state. Id.
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costs associated with disposal of unwanted byproducts, like hazardous waste. Parochial impediments to efficient disposal of these
wastes, therefore, will directly alter the delicate balance of interstate commerce. In effect, interference with the disposal of the
competitiveness of the
unwanted byproduct will adversely affect 17the
4
primary product in interstate commerce.
The service market of commercial hazardous waste disposal is
becoming very competitive. 17 5 Businesses are increasingly focusing on minimizing hazardous waste generation by modifying production processes and implementing waste minimization plans to
reduce the costs associated with hazardous waste disposal.' 76 As
the volume of hazardous waste decreases, these disposal companies
will have to market their services to a broader geographic
area.17 7 Barring any parochial impediments, the hazardous waste
service market will increase the efficiency and decrease the expense of hazardous waste disposal. 178

The court indicated that interstate movement of waste merits the same protection
as that given to the primary product. Id. at 213-14. "If Illinois may not arbitrarily prevent
the importation of electricity generated by nuclear reactors in other states, or of nuclear
fuel to power its own reactors, no more may it arbitrarily prevent the waste products of
nuclear electricity generation from being imported for storage in the state." Id.
174 See, &g., General Elktric, 683 F.2d at 213 ("[To impede the interstate movement
of [nuclear] wastes is as inconsistent with the efficient allocation of resources as to impede the interstate movement of the product that yields them.").
175 See Smith, supra note 11, at 1 (predicting increased competitiveness in commercial
hazardous waste landfill services).
176 Businesses are recognizing that complying with environmental regulations has
become costly and time consuming. For example, TRW spends $20 million per year to
manage its hazardous materials. Debra Polsky, Defense Firms Explore Environmentally Safe
Ways of Cutting Waste, DEFENSE NEWS, July 8, 1991, at 5. In the defense industry,
Northrup has set a corporate goal of reducing its hazardous waste generation 90% by
1996, and Martin Marietta has already reduced its generation of hazardous waste 80%. Id.
Other industries are embarking on similar waste minimization efforts. J. Winston
Porter, Cutting Pollution at the Source, THE CHJsurIAm SCIENCE MONITOR, July 1, 1991, at

18. With these efforts, companies are increasing their productivity and lowering their
costs. Id. 3M, for example, has saved over $435 million as a result of its "Pollution Prevention Pays" program. Crim, supra note 11, at 133. Amoco has saved over $100 million
in a similar program, "Responsible Care," which sets zero as its goal: zero accidents, zero
hazardous waste, zero emissions, and zero environmental and safety citations. Gregory
Morris, Respon/sie Car Amoco, CHEMICAL WEEK, July 17, 1991, at 74.
These programs are also impacting the volume of waste sent to commercial hazardous waste landfills. Smith, supra note 11, at 1. In fact, some companies have cut the
volume of waste sent to hazardous waste land disposal facilities by 50%. Id.
177 Smith, supra note 11, at 1.
178 Hazardous waste land disposal facilities are expanding their services and aggressively pursuing cleanup of Superfund and state hazardous waste sites. Id. at 6-7. In fact,
the industry considers remedial efforts of the nation's hazardous waste sites as the key
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The national common market concept relies on the trading of
goods, but the production of these goods necessarily generates
unwanted byproducts, like hazardous waste. Parochial state efforts
that impede the free flow of these byproducts are tantamount to
interfering with interstate trade of the primary product. With re79
spect to hazardous waste, the Bowman quarantine exception
does not apply; unimpeded interstate flow of hazardous waste adds
value to interstate commerce while the regulatory scheme significantly reduces its dangers. Thus, given the presumption that all
80
objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection,
hazardous waste should receive the same level of protection given
to the interstate trade of a "good."
B. FederalHazardous Waste Regulatory Scheme Does Not
Authorize Alabama's Additional Fee
The Commerce Clause grants virtually unquestioned power to
Congress to regulate commerce among the states. With this power,
Congress can authorize states to enact legislation which would
otherwise violate the Commerce Clause. 1s The Court, however,
requires Congress to give an unambiguous indication of its intent
to authorize the states to enact laws that adversely affect interstate
commerce. 8 2 Congress has established a national program,
through RCRA, for regulating hazardous waste that relies on full
integration of state-authorized hazardous waste programs. 8 3 Federal courts, reviewing state actions limiting hazardous waste imports, conclude that Congress does not authorize the states, under
either RCRA s4 or CERCLA, 1 to take action that would other-

area of future growth. Id.
179 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.

181

See cases cited supra note 62.

182 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1986); see supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1988); 45 Fed. Reg. 3,393 (May 19, 1980); see also

Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431, 435 (D.S.C.),
aftd, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1991).
184 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir.
1991) (upholding preliminary injunction prohibiting South Carolina from implementing
bans and reciprocity requirements before it allows importation of out-of-state hazardous
waste); Ensco, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986) (local ban on incineration of hazardous waste thwarts RCRA objectives); Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (local ban on hazardous waste research project
preempted by RCRA). See generally Stone, supra note 11, at 8-14.
185 Hazardous Waste, 945 F.2d at 795; National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v.
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wise violate the Commerce Clause. Therefore, Alabama cannot rely
on these measures as a basis for removing its Additional Fee from
Commerce Clause scrutiny.
RCRA seeks to ensure that hazardous wastes are handled and
disposed in a safe, environmentally sound manner. 8 To achieve
this objective, Congress allows, through EPA authorization, states
to implement their own hazardous waste management program in
lieu of the federal program. 7 Once a state obtains authorization, nothing in RCRA prohibits the state from imposing more
stringent requirements than the federal standards.ss However,
the scope of this authorization is limited. Because Congress intended these state programs to become integrated into a national
program of hazardous waste control, the state's program must be
"equivalent to" and "consistent with" the federal program, as well
as those of its sister states. 8 9
The consistency criteria are designed to prevent state actions
which limit, directly or indirectly, the importation of hazardous
waste. 9 ° According to the EPA, state programs are inconsistent
when
(a) [a]ny aspect of the State program which unreasonably restricts, impedes, or operates as a ban on the free movement
across the State border of hazardous wastes from or to other
States for treatment, storage, or disposal at facilities authorized
to operate under the Federal or an approved State program... [; (b) [a]ny aspect of State law or of the State program which has no basis in human health or environmental
protection and which acts as a prohibition on the treatment,
storage or disposal of hazardous waste ... [; and] (c) [i]f the
State manifest system does not meet the [proper] requirements .... 191

Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 715 (l1th Cir. 1990) ("Congress has
not ...
authorized Alabama to restrict the free movement of hazardous waste across
Alabama's borders."), nodified, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800
(1991); Alabama v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548, 1555 n.3 (11th
Cir. 1987), cert. died, 110 S. Ct. 538 (1989).
186 BECKER, supra note 11, at 8-9.
187 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988).
188 § 6929; see Ensco, 807 F.2d at 745 (establishing "good faith adaptation" standard);
Stone, supra note 11, at 8-14.
189 -§ 6926; see supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
consistency requirements, see supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
190 BECKER, supra note 11, at 8-9.
191 40 C.F.R. § 271.4 (1991). The EPA's initial explanation of section 271.4 indicates
that any aspect of a state program which operates as a ban on the interstate movement

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1215

Alabama's Additional Fee contradicts the consistency requirements
established by Congress. Since the fee's enactment, waste disposal
at Emelle has dropped 50%.192 Thus, the fee clearly acts as an
indirect ban on the interstate movement of hazardous waste and
interferes with Congress's objective of disposing hazardous waste in
a safe, environmentally sound manner. Congress has not authorized states to act in this manner.
CERCLA also does not demonstrate congressional intent to
redistribute its power over interstate commerce. CERCLA's primary
purpose is the prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites.193
Chemical Waste Management's Emelle facility plays a vital role in
achieving this objective. 4 Emelle receives one-third of the waste
materials shipped offsite from Superfund cleanup sites. 95
Alabama's Additional Fee reduces the effectiveness of CERCLA by
increasing cleanup costs." It also undermines the goals of safe
disposal of hazardous waste and prompt cleanup of hazardous
97
waste sites by erecting a barrier around the State of Alabama.
Alabama cannot rely on CERCLA's disposal capacity requirements as congressional authorization for its Additional Fee.
CERCLA section 104(c)(9)"9 requires each state to provide the
of hazardous waste is automatically inconsistent. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.
South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 793 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 53,395 (1980)).
The Fourth Circuit interprets this explanation as indicating that the EPA would refuse to
authorize a state's program if any aspect would prove unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. Id. In a later statement, the EPA indicates that section 271.4 only prohibits
states with authorized programs from implementing unreasonable restrictions or impediments. Id. at 794 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 46,439 (1985)). The EPA also indicates that it is
not required to use the Constitution's or Congress's test for consistency. Id.; see 50 Fed.
Reg. 46,437 (Nov. 8, 1985) (EPA permitting South Carolina to impose $5 greater fee on
out-of-state hazardous waste because it did not unreasonably restrict movement of hazardous waste). The Fourth Circuit noted that EPA statements do not control in determining
whether a state law is consistent or not, only the Constitution and Congress do. Hazardous Waste 945 F.2d at 794.
192 Chemical Waste Management's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Chemical Waste
(No. 91-471); Loesel, supra note 11, at SR7; U.S. Callsfor End to Alabama Waste Tax, ENGINEERING NEWs, Jan. 20, 1992, at 35 [hereinafter Alabama Waste Tax].
193 See Alabama v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557-58
(l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 538 (1989) (citation omitted).
194 See Chemical Waste Management's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Chemiail
Waste (No. 91-471).
195 Id. at 2 (quoting Brief for the United States at 9, National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (l1th Cir. 1990), modified; 924 F.2d 1001 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991)).
196 Congress expressed concern that increased costs of interstate waste management
would lead to creation of additional Superfund sites. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council
v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 784 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).
197 See supra part II.
198 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §
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EPA with assurance that it has a twenty-year capacity for its hazardous waste.' Congress places the burden of capacity assurances
on the generating state.2° If that state fails to provide the necessary assurances, Congress only denies Superfund money to that
state. 1 It does not impose the sanction of requiring recalcitrant
states to live in environmentally unsafe conditions. 20 2 Congress,
therefore, has not authorized the states to restrict the free movement of hazardous
waste into the state in order to satisfy capacity
20 3
requirements.
Alabama's Additional Fee interferes with safe, efficient disposal
of hazardous waste. Congress, through its broad regulatory
scheme, has not clearly demonstrated its intent to expand the
limits of states' regulatory power otherwise imposed by the Comstate restrictions on
merce Clause. If Congress intends to allow
24
hazardous waste, it still could plainly say so. 0
C.

Strict Review of Alabama's Additional Fee

In the absence of congressional authorization for state discriminatory regulations on interstate commerce, hazardous waste,
as an article of commerce, falls under the Commerce Clause's
broad protection against parochial state regulations. City of Philadelphia, the seminal Commerce Clause waste disposal case, compels
the finding that Alabama's additional disposal tax violates the
Commerce Clause because Alabama's law violates the Court's artic-

9604(c) (9) (1988).
199 Id.
200 Id.; see Hazardous Wastle 945 F.2d at 784-85, 794-95 (capacity assurances designed
to ensure, in theory, that no future cleanup sites arise because sufficient capacity will
exist somewhere).
201 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988). All 50 states have submitted capacity assurance
plans (CAPs) to the EPA. Loesel, supra note 11, at SR7. Of the 47 plans which have

been approved, almost all of them were part of interstate agreements. I& (quoting Jackie
Tenusak, chief of EPA's CAP section).
202 Hazardous Waste, 945 F.2d at 785, 795.
203 See cases cited supra note 184-85.
204 See National Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 721-22. In the area of low-level radioactive
waste, Congress has demonstrated that it knows how to use express language to allow
states to interfere with the free flow of waste. Under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act of 1980 (LLRWPA), 42 U.S.C §§ 2021b-2021j (1988), Congress encouraged
interstate disposal compacts for the establishment and operation of low-level radioactive
waste facilities. § 2021d. The Act, which predates SARA, authorizes approved compacts to
bar wastes generated outside the states comprising that compact.§ 2021e(e) (2). For a
comparison of LLRWPA and CERCLA, see Stone, supra note 11, at 25-30 (advocating
LLRWPA as a model program for hazardous waste disposal).
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ulated nondiscriminatory principle. 20 5 Even if City of Philadelphia
does not compel this conclusion, Alabama's Additional Fee cannot
withstand the strict Commerce Clause review given to discriminatory state regulatory measures. Although the Commerce Clause's
2
limitation on state regulatory power "is by no means absolute," 0
the state's burden of justification is heavy. In its analysis, the Alabama Supreme Court uses the proper words, but fails to apply the
level of scrutiny that the Supreme Court demands when reviewing
state laws that facially discriminate against interstate commerce.
This failure is due to the Alabama Supreme Court's misapplication
of Maine v. Taylor. 7 In reality, Alabama has not met its burden
of proof. Assuming that the Additional Fee serves legitimate local
objectives, 8
reasonable,
nondiscriminatory
alternatives
to
Alabama's higher disposal tax on out-of-state hazardous waste exist.
1. City of Philadelphia Compels the Finding that the Additional
Fee Violates the Commerce Clause
The City of Philadelphiaopinion demonstrates the nondiscrimination principle that governs interstate commerce."° The Court,
under this principle, prohibits a state from treating domestic and
foreign articles of commerce differently unless some reason, apart
from their origin, exists to treat them differently. The Alabama
Supreme Court concludes that Alabama has financial, health, and
environmental reasons for treating. out-of-state hazardous waste
differently."' In reality, these reasons do not present an adequate basis for Alabama's discriminatory treatment of out-of-state
hazardous waste. The State fails to demonstrate that Alabama
suffers a disproportionate financial burden from out-of-state hazardous waste that necessitates a greater disposal tax on that
waste.21 ' Instead, a uniform tax on all hazardous waste would off-

205

See supra notes 66 & 76-85 and accompanying text.

206 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers,
Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980)).
207 437 U.S. 131 (1986).
208 See local objectives listed supra text accompanying note 147.
209 See supra notes 66 & 76-85 and accompanying text.
210 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1388-89 (Ala. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).

211 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, in Commerce
Clause cases, places the burden on the state to justify its regulatory measure both in
terms of local benefits and nondiscriminatory alternatives. See e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 152-53 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336
(1979); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (1977);
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set Alabama's financial burden because of the disposal of in-state
and out-of-state hazardous waste in Alabama. 212 Public health and
environmental concerns also do not provide sufficient foundation
for Alabama's discriminatory measure. Hazardous waste, regardless
of its source, presents the same health, safety, and environmental
concerns. 2 1 Because in-state and out-of-state hazardous waste are
not sufficiently different, City of Philadelphia compels the finding
that the Additional Fee violates the Commerce Clause's nondiscrimination principle and, therefore, is unconstitutional.
The Alabama Supreme Court, however, attempts to distinguish
City of Philadelphiaby narrowly interpreting its holding.2 4 According to the Alabama Supreme Court, City of Philadelphia'sholding
only applies to state statutes enacted for simple economic protectionism and does not apply to statutes motivated by noneconomic
objectives, such as protection of public health, safety, or the environment. 215 Thus, based on its misinterpretation of City of Phila-

Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 429 U.S. 366, 373 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
212 See infra notes 241-246 and accompanying text.
213 Chemical Waste Management's Petition 'for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Chemical Waste
(No. 91-471) (citing Alabama trial court for finding that out-of-state hazardous waste
poses the same safety and environmental concerns as in-state waste); see Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 788 (1991) (out-of-state hazardous
waste posis the same threat as waste generated in-state); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 720 (11th Cir. 1990),
modifed, 924 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991); cf. Washington
State Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 913) (state fails to
address superior safety and environmental virtues of in-state, low-level radioactive waste).
214 Sce supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
215 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1387 (Ala. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
The court also distinguishes National Solid Wastes' ruling on similar grounds. The
Eleventh Circuit, in National Solid Wastes held that Alabama's selective ban on out-of-state
hazardous waste, commonly known as the Holley Bill, violated the Commerce Clause
because it did "not distinguish on the basis of type of waste or degree of dangerousness,
but on the basis of the state of generation." National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v.
Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 721 (l1th Cir. 1990), modifid 924
F.2d 1001, cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991). Relying on this quote, the Alabama Supreme Court, in Chemical Waste, interprets the Eleventh Circuit's holding as characterizing
the Holley Bill as a measure designed for the purpose of economic protectionism. Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1387. In contrast, the Alabama Supreme Court characterizes Act
No. 90-326, containing the Additional Fee provision, as a measure "specifically found by
the legislature to be an effective way to deal with health and environmental hazards to
Alabamians created by hazardous waste imported . . . from other states." Id.
The court's attempt to distinguish the Holley bill fails. The legislative findings of
both pieces of legislation reflect the same intentions and objectives. Compare 1989 Ala.
Acts No. 89-788 § 1(8) to (14) (1989) (motivated by fear of increasing volumes of out-of-
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delphia, the Alabama Supreme Court only compares the objectives
motivating Alabama's differential fee structure with those served by
New Jersey's import ban.216 Yet, the Court, in City of Philadelphia,
clearly indicates that the Commerce Clause limits state acts which
discriminate against interstate trade in their effect, regardless of
the legislative purpose underlying the statute. 7 Subsequent
court decisions clearly demonstrate that the Commerce Clause
limits the state's ability to achieve noneconomic objectives, such as
resource conservation and environmental protection, by enacting
218
legislation which discriminates against interstate commerce.
Thus, distinguishing City of Philadelphia on an economic/noneconomic basis is untenable.
In addition, state acts motivated by noneconomic reasons can
still result

in economic

protectionism

of in-state concerns.

219

Alabama's Additional Fee essentially protects in-state hazardous
waste generators, in direct contradiction with City of Philadelphia.

state hazardous waste, desire for distributing the financial burden caused by this waste,
and interest in protecting its citizens and environment) with AL. CODE § 22-30B-1.1(1)
to (8) (motivated by increase in volume of out-of-state hazardous waste, desire for distributing the financial burden caused by this waste, interest in protecting its citizens and
environment, and encourage industry to eliminate hazardous waste generation).
216 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
217 "[Tihe evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative
ends. Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate aim of [New Jersey's ban] is to
reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands
from pollution, for we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626
(1978).
218 &e New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 n.3 (1988) (subjective purpose of protecting public health, even if true, "inadequate to validate patent discrimination against interstate commerce"); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 n.19 (1986)
(City of Philadelphiarule applies "not only to laws motivated by a desire to protect local
industries from out-of-state competition, but also to laws that respond to legitimate local
concerns by discriminating arbitrarily against interstate trade"); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1980) ("When legislating in areas of legitimate local
concern, such as environmental protection and resource conservation, States are nonetheless limited by the Commerce Clause.") (citations omitted); Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) ("[Finding that state legislation
furthers matters of legitimate local concern, even in the health and consumer protection
areas, does not end the inquiry. Such a view, we have noted, 'would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action . . . save for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.'") (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 397 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)); National
Solid Wastes, 910 F.2d at 725 (noting that Alabama's honorable intentions in attempting
to come to grips with its environmental problems do not remove its laws from Commerce Clause scrutiny).
219 The Court has invalidated state statutes because of an economic protectionist
effect. See cases cited supra 72.
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Because of Alabama's higher tax on foreign hazardous waste, domestic hazardous waste generators enjoy a preferred right of access
to commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities located in
Alabama over those generators located in other states.2 0 In effect, Alabama places the burden of conserving its natural resources
on out-of-state hazardous waste generators while exempting in-state
generators. As a result, in-state businesses gain a competitive advantage over foreign businesses in the primary product and land
disposal markets." 1 Alabama's Additional Fee, thus, results in
economic protectionism. According to the Court, "where simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually
22
per se rule of invalidity has been erected."
2. Alabama's Additional
Commerce Clause Review

Fee

Does

Not

Withstand

Strict

Even if City of Philadelphia does not compel the conclusion
that Alabama's Additional Fee violates the Commerce Clause, the
law must still withstand strict Commerce Clause scrutiny. Alabama's
Supreme Court relies on Maine v. Taylor 2- as authority for its
position that "environmental measures are entitled to greater deference than ordinary legislative acts."224 The Alabama Supreme
Court's interpretation is supported by the fact that the Taylor
Court seems to defer to Maine's proffered environmental justification for the total ban on out-of-state baitfish. 225 The Court stat-

220 See City of Philadephia, 437 U.S. at 627 ("a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders").
The Fourth Circuit noted that it is better that the burden of hazardous waste disposal and treatment fall disproportionately among the states than that future Superfund
sites are created. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781,
792 (4th Cir. 1991); cf. Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir. 1982)
(nuclear waste disposal should be stored without regard to parochial interests of the
state), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
221 See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
222 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (citations omitted);
see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text; see also Regan, supra note 45, at 1269 (stating that the City of Philadelphia Court recognizes that protectionist motivation of any feature of a statute makes that statute unconstitutional).
223 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
224 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1388 (Ala. 1991),
cert. granted 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
225 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 152-53 (Steven, J., dissenting) (arguing that presumption that
possible presence of parasites and nonnative species in out-of-state balitfish shipments
could cause ecological impact should run against state). The majority opinion, however,
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ed that "Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that
they may ultimately prove to be negligible." 226 Similarly, Alabama
has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens and natural resources from unquantifiable risks associated with hazardous waste
disposal, even though the comprehensive regulatory scheme may
negate those risks.
In contrast to the deference given to the existence of legitimate interests, the Taylor opinion does not permit a less-than-strict
scrutiny of the means used to achieve those health, safety, and
environmental objectives. The Court strictly scrutinizes 227 Maine's
total ban on out-of-state baitfish and determines that reasonable,
alternative inspection techniques did not exist. 228 Taylor, therefore, lies squarely on the proposition that out-of-state baitfish were
in fact different from in-state species and posed substantial danger
to Maine's delicate ecological balance. 21 In contrast, in-state and

states that Maine's proffered justification must survive the strictest scrutiny. Id. at 144.
In the area of transportation safety, the Court has expressed a deferential standard
of review to state measures. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,
675 (1981) (recognizing 'special deference' to highway safety regulations); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1977) (challengers of "state regulations
said to promote highway safety must overcome 'a strong presumption of [their] validity.'") (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959)). The Court's
deference to state highway safety regulations derives in part from an assumption that the
regulations apply evenhandedly and the burdens placed on local economic interests will
act as a politica check against burdensome regulations. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 675-76;
Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 444 n.18. Its deferential policy also derives from the fact that
states have primary responsibility for construction, maintenance, and policing their highways and that highway conditions vary among the states. See Kasse, 450 U.S. at 675-76;
Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 444 n.18.
Alabama's Additional Fee does not fulfill these policy requirements for affording
deferential review. The fee facially discriminates against out-of-state hazardous waste generators; it does not serve as a political check because in-state generators enjoy a competitive advantage in both the primary product and waste disposal costs. See supra notes 17280 and accompanying text. Also, hazardous waste disposal conditions do not vary among
the states, unlike highway conditions, because of the comprehensive hazardous waste
regulatory scheme in place, see supra Part II, and the consistency requirements ensure
that the state schemes are similar.
e supra notes 34-36, 181-90 and accompanying text.
226 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.
227 Id. at 140.
228 Id. at 146-47 (scientifically accepted techniques for sampling and inspecting live
baitfish not available).
229 In Taylor, Maine banned the importation of out-of-state baitfish because they contained parasites "not common to wild fish in Maine," and shipments of these baitfish
could include nonnative Maine species that "could disturb Maine's aquatic ecology to an
unpredictable extent." Id at 141-43.
Taylor demonstrates that not all barriers to interstate trade are protectionist, id. at
148 n.19, and that the Commerce Clause does not guarantee the right to import into a
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out-of-state hazardous waste do not have similar distinguishing
characteristics. Regardless of where the hazardous waste originates,
it creates significant potential danger to the State's environment
and citizens." 0 In fact, the trial court specifically recognizes that
in-state waste does not enjoy superior environmental and safety virtues over out-of-state waste and, therefore, rejects the State's proffered safety and environmental reasons for treating out-of-state
hazardous waste differently. 3 1 Because in-state and out-of-state
hazardous waste do not substantially differ, Taylor does not authorize the Alabama Supreme Court to lower its level of review of
Alabama's Additional Fee.
Because of its misplaced reliance on Taylor, the Alabama Supreme Court, in upholding the Additional Fee, did not apply the
level of review that courts are required to apply to state laws that
facially discriminate against interstate commerce. Assuming that
legitimate,

noneconomic

concerns exist,2

2

the Additional Fee

provision violates the Commerce Clause because it arbitrarily discriminates against out-of-state hazardous waste. A proper examination of Alabama's law demonstrates that reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives would have effectively met the Legislature's
intended objectives. Thus, the Additional Fee unconstitutionally
interferes with the free flow of interstate commerce.
The Additional Fee does not serve the health and safety purposes espoused by its Legislature. Logically, if the Legislature in-

state whatever one may please regardless of its effect on the state. Id. (citations omitted).
Maine's barrier is not a protectionist measure because differences did exist between instate and out-of-state baitfish. Taylor, thus, is an example of the Court's quarantine exception to the Commerce Clause. Se4 e.g., Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465
(1888). The implicit assumption in upholding these import bans is that the quarantine is
aimed at protecting the state from some harmful item that does not exist locally, see
Regan, supra note 45, at 1270, but this is not the case in Chemical Waste- In effect, quarantine cases demonstrate that "[t]he hostility is to the thing itself," Illinois v. General
'Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983), and that the state
is simply acting to prevent harm to its citizens and environment, regardless of where the
harmful item originates. Id.
230 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
231 See supra text accompanying note 147.
232 For the objectives served by the Additional Fee, see supra text accompanying note
147.
The Court has consistently held that health, safety, and environmental issues are
proper matters of local concern. Se, eg., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986)
(state has regulatory power to protect health and safety of its citizens and integrity of its
natural resources); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1980) (environmental protection and resource conservation); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (health and consumer protection).
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tends to use the revenue generated by its additional tax to protect
its citizens and environment, it would have allocated the revenue
to an environmental protection/health safety fund in order to
provide such a safeguard. The Legislature instead places a majority
of the proceeds into "the general budget of the state to be used
for general operations. " "' Clearly, Alabama intends to benefit
from the Additional Fee proceeds by enhancing its financial position, rather than using the revenue to provide adequate health
protection measures against toxic exposure or to ensure the level
of monitoring necessary to protect the State's natural resources,
and citizens, and to establish sufficient financial resources to cover
potential future remedial efforts.
Even if Alabama allocated all the Additional Fee's proceeds to
an environmental protection/health safety fund, the provision
would still not withstand strict Commerce Clause scrutiny. Alabama
contends that the Additional Fee is necessary to offset potential
future remedial costs.25 4 The Supreme Court, in

Complete Auto

Transit, Inc. v. Brady,2"5 specifically recognizes that "interstate
commerce may be made to pay its way."" 6 According to Complete
Auto, state tax measures survive Commerce Clause scrutiny if the
tax is: "applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided
by the State."2 7 Alabama's Additional Fee fails the nondiscrim-

233 ALA. CODE § 22-30B-3 (1990) (10% of funds allocated for administrative and collection costs). The Legislature allocated a maximum of $4.2 million per year to the
county housing a hazardous waste site, § 22-30B-2.1, and a maximum of $4.5 million per
year to a public health finance authority fund, § 22-30B-2.2. Apparently, the Legislature
expects low future costs associated with monitoring, regulating, and remedial efforts for
Emelle. Furthermore, the Additional Fee is not necessary to provide financial resources
for these two allotments. At a volume of 350,000 tons per year, see Alabama Waste Tax,
supra note 192, at 35 (Chemical Waste Management, Inc. spokesman stating that waste
shipments to Emelle fell below 400,000 tons per year), the revenues generated from the
Base Fee ($25.60 per ton) will cover these allocations. Therefore, the proceeds from the
Additional Fee will go solely into Alabama's general fund. In total, Alabama collects
about $25 million per year in extra fees under the law. Paul Kemezis, CMA and Waste
Generators Fight Alabama's Fee Structure, CHEMICAL WEEK, Nov. 6, 1991, at 14.
234 Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1389 (Ala. 1991),
cert. granted, 112 S. CL 964 (1992).
235 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
236 Id. at 284.
237 Id. at 279; accord Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 754 (1980); Department of
Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978); see
also Sedler, supra note 47, at 912-14 (elements (1), (2), and (4) measure due process
concerns of reasonableness and fairness; element (3) measures Commerce Clause con-
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inatory element of the Complete Auto test. Because Alabama only
applies the tax to out-of-state generators, in-state generators enjoy
a commercial advantage in their waste needs that translates directThe effect of the Additional Fee
ly to the primary product'
contradicts the Court's holding that "[n]o State, consistent with
the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax which discriminates
against interstate commerce ... by providing a direct commercial
advantage to local business." 23 9 Alabama's tax discriminates because of the interstate nature 24of the hazardous waste, and, thus,
violates the Commerce Clause. 0
Other measures can provide the same, or higher, level of
security without discriminating against out-of-state generators. For
example, Alabama could enact a nondiscriminatory tax,2 4' like
the Base Fee that the Chemical Waste court upheld,2 4 2 on all haz-

cerns).
Underlying these tests is an "internal consistency" principle. This principle requires
that if the state tax were "applied by every jurisdiction, there would be no impermissible
interference with free trade." American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 283
(1987) (quoting Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1984)). See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA Er AL, 1 TREATISE ON CONSTTUTIONAL LAW. SUBSrANCE AND PROCEDURE § 13.2 (1st ed. 1986 & Supp. 1991).
238 See discussion of waste disposal costs on the primary product supra notes 172-80.
239 Maryland, 451 U.S. at 754 (citations omitted).
240 See, eg., American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 286 ("[A] state tax that favors in-state business over out-of-state business for no other reason than the location of its business is
prohibited by the Commerce Clause."); Bachus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)
(tax on out-of-state competitors in order to promote consumption of local liquor violates
cardinal rule of Commerce Clause forbidding preferential treatment); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 335 (1977) (constitutionally impermissible to
discriminate between two types of interstate transactions in order to promote in-state
interests); see also Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation: Purposeful
Economic Protectionism and Beyond, 85 MICH. L REV. 758 (1986-87) (addressing Supreme
Court limitations on state taxation); Sedier, supra 47, at 912-14 (preventing discrimination
is primary purpose of tax Commerce Clause jurisprudence). Several district courts have
recently struck down state additional disposal tax on out-of-state solid waste. See National
Solid Waste Management Ass'n v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (granting summary judgement because no compelling reason for Ohio's mandatory 3:1 tax
ratio offered), revd, No. 91-3466, 1992 WL 58147 (6th Cir. March 4, 1992) (evidentiary
hearing to determine whether compelling interest exists is required); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Indiana, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (accepting
state's health and welfare reasons for differential tax but found less discriminatory means
available).
241 The Supreme Court has upheld nondiscriminatory taxes. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (neutral severance on coal); EvansvilleVanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972) (neutral user
fee). But see American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (flat axle tax
violates Commerce Clause because of discriminatory effect).
242 The Chemical Waste court upheld Alabama's Base Fee provision after applying the
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ardous waste disposed at commercial facilities within Alabama. A
flat tax will properly apportion the costs associated with Emelle
among in-state and out-of-state hazardous waste generators. Those
generators who dispose more waste at Emelle will bear a greater
share of the State's financial burden. An evenhanded tax also
meets the criteria established in Complete Auto for state tax measures. 243 The required nexus exists because the disposal activities
taxed occur within Alabama. A nondiscriminatory fee meets the
fairly-apportioned requirement because the tax does not cause a
multiple tax situation for the same activity. 24 The fee is fairly
related to the services provided because the tax is measured by
the tonnage of waste disposed in Alabama.2 45 Finally, a flat tax
does not discriminate against interstate commerce. It merely apportions the burden among those generators who use Emelle to
dispose their waste. Thus, instead of improperly focusing on the
waste's state of origin, a nondiscriminatory tax will equitably allocate the State's burden among those who created it.2'
In addition to financial resources, an elaborate federal/state
hazardous waste regulatory scheme already in place 247 presents a
reasonable, effective alternative for protecting the people and
natural resources of Alabama from hazardous waste risks. Chemical
Waste Management's Emelle facility operates under both federal
and state permits that require hazardous waste facilities to comply
with stringent regulations designed to ensure safe disposal of hazardous waste. 24 In fact, Governor Guy Hunt of Alabama considers Emelle one of the "safest [hazardous waste land disposal facilities] in the country."249 Although absolute protection from haz25 0
ardous wastes' dangers is not feasible with current technology,

Pike balancing test. For a discussion of this analysis, see supra note 129.
243 For the text of the test, see supra text accompanying note 237.
244 See Amerada Hess Corp. v. New Jersey Div. of Taxation, 490 U.S. 66, 73-75
(1989).
245 The measure of the tax must only be reasonably related to the extent of the
contact. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 626-27; see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 14-15, Chemical Waste (No. 91-417).
246 To a certain extent, Alabama can rely on CERCLA to recover remedial costs for
hazardous waste sites harming the environment or human health. See supra notes 37-44
and accompanying text for the extent of CERCLA's financial assistance.
247 For a discussion of this scheme, see supra part II.
248 See supra note 103.
249 Chemical Waste Management's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Chemical Waste
(No. 91-471) (quoting Alabama's Governor Guy Hunt).
250 See, eg., Hunt v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1374 (Ala.
1991) (noting EPA finding that current synthetic liners do not prevent waste from mi-
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the elaborate regulatory scheme gives to the individual states, like
Alabama, a reasonable means of protecting its citizens. In addition, states have the power to alter general regulations to coincide
with the characteristics unique to that individual state. 251 For example, Alabama can enact stricter regulations and require that instate operators utilize new disposal techniques as the new hazardous waste disposal technology becomes available. Furthermore, the
federal government developed a comprehensive scheme for hazardous waste transporters designed to protect human health and2
the environment by reducing the probability of toxic spills.Z
Unlike the Additional Fee provision enacted by Alabama's Legislature, the comprehensive hazardous waste regulatory scheme effectively protects the citizens of Alabama in a nondiscriminatory manner.
According to the Alabama Supreme Court, the Additional Fee
serves the legitimate local interests of conserving Alabama's natural
resources and reducing the hazardous waste volume travelling on
Alabama's highways. Evidence indicates that the Additional Fee
serves these objectives effectively. Since its enactment, the yearly
volume of hazardous waste disposed at Emelle has dropped about
50%." However, other nondiscriminatory measures can achieve
these goals just as effectively. For example, placing a cap on the
volume of all waste disposed at large commercial hazardous" waste
land disposal facilities would effectively preserve Alabama's disposal
capacity and limit the number of trucks hauling hazardous waste
on Alabama's highways.' Alabama already caps the volume of

grating), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964 (1992).
251 The extent to which a state can alter its hazardous waste regulations is limited.
See supra notes 33-36, 181-192 and accompanying text.
252 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
253 Alabama Waste Tax, supra note 192, at 35.
254 Prior to the cap, the Alabama court notes that Emelle was quickly reaching its
disposal capacity, primarily due to the large influx of out-of-state waste. Hunt v. Chemical
Waste Management, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1367, 1389 (Ala. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 964
(1992). Also, 85% to 90% of the 40,000 truckloads of waste entering Emelle in 1989
originated outside of Alabama. Id. at 1375.
The Court recognizes that states have the power to conserve their natural resources
and protect their environment by "slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce'may incidentally be affected." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978); cf. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 732 F. Supp 761 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (statute requiring county approval for disposal of out-of-county waste serve legitimate purpose of extending lives of county's landfills), affd, 931 F. 2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. granted sub. nom.,
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 857
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all waste entering Emelle, regardless of its state of origin. 5 With
a valid cap, Alabama does not face a situation in which imported
hazardous waste is dramatically increasing and threatening to consume all of Alabama's disposal capacity. The cap provision effectively conserves the State's natural resources and reduces the volume of waste transported on its highways. The Alabama Supreme
Court erred by not relying on the cap provision as a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory alternative to the Additional Fee.
Finally, the Alabama Supreme Court justifies the Legislature's
use of the Additional Fee on the basis that it compensates the
State's taxpayers for the costs and burdens that out-of-state generators impose by dumping their waste in Alabama. However, the
Alabama court did not analyze the Additional Fee under the Supreme Court's "compensatory tax" doctrine. This doctrine permits
a state to impose an additional tax on out-of-state commerce in
order to "equalize[] previously unequal tax burdens by offsetting
'a specific tax imposed only on intrastate commerce for a substan'
tially equivalent event.'" 256

The Supreme Court states that a condition precedent to enacting a compensatory tax is that the state first must identify the

(1992).
A state, however, may not give its citizens a preferred right of access to its natural
resources. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 625; see also Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
255 Ai CODE § 22-30B-1.1(9) (1990). The Alabama Supreme Court ruled that this
provision does not violate the Commerce Clause. Chemical Waste 584 So. 2d at 1380-81.
The court analyzed the Cap provision using the Pike balancing test because the
provision applied uniformly to in-state and out-of-state waste. Id. at 1380. The court
found that the cap serves the legitimate local purpose of extending the life of the landfill for all waste generators. Id. Noting that landfilling is the least desirable method of
disposing hazardous waste, the court also found that it furthers the State's interest in
controlling health and safety risks by regulating the amount of waste travelling on its
highways. Id. at 1381. In light of these legitimate purposes, the court also determined
that the cap created "no discriminatory burden on existing levels of commerce or on
existing rates of waste generation and landfilling." Id. Thus, the court concluded that a
cap does not violate the Commerce Clause. Id.; see also Wetzel County Solid Waste Auth.
v. West Va. Div. of Natural Resources,, 401 S.E. 2d 227 (W. Va. 1990) (tonnage restrictions which apply equally to all solid waste, regardless of origin, do not violate Commerce Clause).
256 American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 287 (1986) (citations omitted); see also Tyler Pipe Ind., Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232,
242-44 (1987); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1984).
The common theme underlying states' compensatory taxes is that the states are
attempting to assure equal treatment between intrastate and interstate commerce. Mary.
land v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 (1981); see also Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 331-32 (1977); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 58384 (1937).
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burden for which it is attempting to compensate. 7 The Alabama Supreme Court recognizes that the State is trying to compensate for the expense of monitoring, regulating, and reducing
the potential health and environmental harms associated with the
Emelle hazardous waste facility."8 However, no evidence demonstrates that in-state hazardous waste generators suffer a disproportionate tax burden as a result of Emelle. 9
Instead of relying on the burdens of specific taxpayers as required by the Court, the Alabama Supreme Court considers the
increased tax burden imposed on all of Alabama's taxpayers due
to Emelle.26 The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that a
"state [cannot] impose [an additional] tax on out-of-state businesses and justify [it] on the basis that the tax was in lieu of other
types of state taxes." 261 In addition, an unquantified burden on
all taxpayers does not satisfy the doctrine's requirement of "substantially equivalent" items of commerce. 262 Therefore, the court
cannot rely on the Supreme Court's compensatory tax exception
as authority for upholding the Additional Fee against the Commerce Clause's free trade ideal.
D. Conclusion
The Commerce Clause limits state regulatory power in favor
of creating national economic unity. Hazardous waste is an article
of commerce subject to Commerce Clause protection and disposal
of these wastes is a matter of national concern. The free flow of
hazardous waste in interstate commerce ensures that future cleanup sites are not created.265 Open borders are essential to protect

257 Maryland, 451 U.S. at 758.
258 Chemical Waste 584 So. 2d at 1389; see also ALA. CODE § 22-30B-1.1 (1990)
(Alabama's legislative findings supporting its differential taxing scheme).
259 See supra part ll.B. Because Alabama's Legislature only recognizes a $4.5 million
per year need for the State's related hazardous waste issues, the revenue generated from
the Additional Fee is not necessary to provide this financial this support. See supra note
233.
260 Chemical Waste, 584 So. 2d at 1389 ("A disproportionate share of these costs will
be borne by the taxpayers of the State of Alabama for the wastes dumped by other
states.").
261 ROTUNDA Ex AL-, supra note 237, § 13.2, at 267 (Supp. 1991) (discussing American
Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner); see American Trucking Ass'ns v. Schener, 483 U.S. 266, 287-89
(1986).
262 See American Trucking, 483 U.S. at 287; Maryland, 451 U.S. at 758-59 (sales tax and
use tax seen as equivalent taxes, but Louisiana's First-Use Tax does not complement its
Severance Tax imposed on local production of natural gas).
263 See; &g., Waste Shipment Bans Seen Danger to Chemicals; Hazardous Waste Transportation
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the nation's citizens and ensure that 2 hazardous waste is disposed
in an environmentally sound manner. 6
Congress has not authorized states to limit the importation of
hazardous waste by discriminating against out-of-state interests. Yet,
despite the lack of congressional authorization, states like Alabama
are threatening these national goals by enacting legislation that
effectively limits the importation of out-of-state hazardous waste.
Alabama has just intentions for enacting its discriminatory measure. The State wants to protect its citizens and environment from
the potential dangers of hazardous waste and equitably distribute
the financial burdens associated with housing the Emelle facility in
its State.
Despite these legitimate objectives, Alabama cannot enact a
measure which arbitrarily discriminates against out-of-state hazardous waste without congressional approval. In its plain effect,
Alabama's higher disposal tax on out-of-state hazardous waste violates the nondiscrimination principle underlying the Commerce
Clause. Alabama does not have an adequate basis for erecting a
barrier against out-of-state waste because hazardous waste, regardless of its source, creates the same financial, health, and environmental concerns. Essentially, Alabama is offering a preferred right
of access, in violation of City of Philadelphia,265 to in-state companies which generate hazardous waste.
In addition, reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives are
available that the State could have instituted in place of the Additional Fee. Alabama can institute a nondiscriminatory tax which
would equitably place the burden on the generators of the
waste. 26 A uniform tax, set properly, would supply Alabama with
sufficient revenue to offset the State's additional costs resulting
from Emelle. It can require strict conformance to the comprehensive regulatory program in order to minimize the potential risks of
hazardous waste. Finally, the State can impose a cap on all hazardous waste entering land disposal facilities in Alabama which
would effectively conserve Alabama's natural resources and limit
the volume of hazardous waste travelling on its roads.

Policy, CHEMICAL MARKETING REPORTER, May 13, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter Waste Shipment
Bans]; Battles Brew, supra note 3, at SR12.
264 See, e.g., Kemezis, supra note 233; Controversy Continues, supra note 11 (interstate

hazardous waste requires open borders in order to safely manage the waste); Waste Shipment Bans, supra note 263, at 3.
265 See supra notes 76-85 & 209-22 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 241-46 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has established a high standard that a
state must overcome before its discriminatory regulatory measure
that interferes with interstate trade can withstand strict Commerce
Clause review. Alabama has not overcome this hurdle. Even
though Alabama's'Additional Fee serves legitimate local objectives,
reasonable alternatives exist that will serve the State's objectives
just as effectively, without discriminating against out-of-state interests. Because alternatives to placing a higher disposal tax on outof-state waste exist, Alabama's Additional Fee unnecessarily interThus, the Alabama Supreme
feres with interstate commerce.
Court erred when it failed to rule that the Additional Fee violates
the Commerce Clause.
VI. PROPOSAL: A UNIFORM TAx ON HAZARDOUS
WASTE GENERATORS

States cannot discriminate against out-of-state hazardous waste
generators by imposing a higher disposal ,tax on hazardous waste
generated outside that state. However, maintaining the status quo
would unfairly place the hazardous waste burden on a minority of
the states that house hazardous waste facilities while the rest of
the nation enjoys the benefits associated with the generation of
hazardous waste. This problem requires a national solution to balance these competing interests.
Congress should resolve this controversy by instituting a uniform fee on all hazardous waste disposed in landfills. The tax will
encourage waste generators to develop waste minimization plans. It
will also discourage land disposal of hazardous waste, thus, supporting the federal policy against landfilling these wastes.26 A
uniform tax will also ensure that states choosing to house hazardous waste facilities will not bear the long-term financial burden by
permitting a hazardous waste treatment facility to operate within
its state. Instead, those generators creating the hazardous waste
disposal problem will equitably bear the financial responsibility for
their actions.
Congress must act to resolve the interstate hazardous waste
disposal controversy threatening to divide the nation. Recently
members of Congress have focused their efforts on conservation
and hazardous waste minimization."8 While this approach will
267 See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
268 S. 976, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
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logically reduce the volume of waste requiring land disposal, it
may serve to intensify the interstate controversy. Hazardous waste
landfills draw hazardous waste from a broader geographic area, requiring interstate shipments of hazardous waste. 9 Therefore,
reaching an effective solution requires a delicate balance of the
federal interest in safe, efficient disposal of hazardous waste and
cleanup of existing hazardous waste sites against the states' interest
in equitably distributing the burden of hazardous waste land disposal. A uniform tax, set by Congress, on all hazardous waste
generators who dispose waste at land disposal facilities will effectively fulfill these interests.
Conservation and waste minimization should be at the forefront of the hazardous waste solution. Some businesses have voluntarily engaged in these efforts and have reaped substantial economic benefits. 271 Members of Congress have recently recognized
the economic and environmental benefits of conservation and
waste minimization as well.2 ' In fact, reducing the generation of
hazardous waste is the principal focus of a proposed Senate bill
for amending RCRA 2 The bill proposes to use financial incentives to encourage all businesses to reformulate their manufacturing processes, substitute nontoxic materials, and generally reduce
the volume of waste requiring treatment and disposal. 27 However, the bill will not address the interstate transportation of hazardous waste issue.

4

Amendments of 1991). The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works is currently reviewing the Bill, authored by Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.), and is working
against a deadline of April 30, 1992. Solid Waste: Senate RCRA Bill Undergoing Revision,. Key
Committees Press for Quick Action, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2323 (Feb. 7, 1992) [hereinafter
RCRA Revision]. When introduced to the Senate, the bill authorized importing states to
impose fees on waste exported from other states and states having their own approved
waste management plans to ban the import of waste outright. 137 CONG. REc. S5167-01
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991). However, an aide who works with the Subcommittee on Environmental Protection recently stated that the revised version of S. 976 will not address
the interstate transportation of hazardous waste because such a provision would upset
capacity agreements currently in place. RCRA Revision, supra. Instead, the committee is
now focusing on recovery and conservation. Id.
269 See Smith, supra note 11, at 3-4 (general consensus among waste treatment companies); see also Loesel, supra note 11, at SR7 (waste management firms have centralized
waste facilities, making interstate transport absolutely essential) (quoting Larry Bone, Dow
Chemical's senior associate environmental consultant).
270 Smith, supra note 11, at 3 (general consensus among waste treatment companies
is that waste minimization is working); see supra note 176.
271 See supra note 268.
272 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
273 See RCRA Revision, supra note 268, at 2323.
274 See supra note 268 for a discussion of S. 976. Committee's in both the Senate
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While focusing on conservation and waste minimization makes
sense, it may exacerbate the current hazardous waste land disposal
controversy. Industry cannot eliminate the volume of hazardous
waste that it generates, but can only reduce it. 275 According to
industry executives, interstate shipments are necessary to ensure
that hazardous waste is treated in the most environmentally sound
manner.26 Most of the waste shipped outside the generating

277
state requires specialized technology not available in that state.

Requiring each state to provide the full range of hazardous waste
TSD facilities will dramatically increase the cost of hazardous waste
disposal and may act as an incentive for illegal and improper disposal. 278 These consequences contradict the national policy of
safe, efficient disposal of hazardous waste. With effective waste
minimization and conservation, states will rely on a state-to-state
network of interdependence. As the volume of hazardous waste
requiring land disposal decreases, land disposal facilities will become centralized and will rely on interstate waste shipments in
order to remain economically viable operations. 279 States housing
these facilities will still bear the brunt of the nation's hazardous
waste disposal problem.8 0
A uniform tax on all hazardous waste generators disposing
their waste at landfills will distribute this burden among those
businesses causing the problem. The tax will encourage industry to
minimize or recycle its waste. At the same time, it will discourage
land disposal, which is the least desired means of hazardous waste

and House of Representatives are currently discussing other measures which would grant
states authority to regulate interstate disposal of hazardous waste. See S. 592, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) (authorizing state to impose a fee or limit volume of waste transported
into that state for purposes of treatment, storage, or disposal); H.R. 3235, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991) (prohibiting transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal hazardous
waste outside state of generation, after 1994).
Recently, the National Governors' Association Committee on Energy and Environment struck down a waste management policy that would have supported state bans and
fees on waste imports to commercial and federal disposal facilities. Controversy Continues,
supra note 11. The vote fell one vote short of the 10 needed for approval. Id.
275 Crim, supra note 11, at 133.
276 See supra note 263-64 and accompanying text.
277 See, e.g., Kemezis, supra note 233; Controvery Continues, supra note 11.
278 See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
279 See supra note 269.
280 As the Fourth Circuit recently noted, the treatment and disposal of hazardous
waste is necessary to prevent future superfund sites, "even if spread disproportionately
among the states." Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781,
792 (4th Cir. 1991).
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disposal, in favor of other methods of treating hazardous wastes
that are presently more expensive.281 A uniform national tax also
ensures that state parochial measures will not impede the cleanup
of existing hazardous waste sites. Without a uniform tax, the states
will continue to enact measures limiting the volume of waste entering from outside their borders.8 2 Allowing such acts to continue will only make these remedial efforts less efficient and less
economical. 2 3
In addition to serving these federal hazardous waste objectives,
a uniform tax will satisfy the states' interest in protecting their
environment and citizens and will equitably distribute the longterm burdens of housing these facilities among those who create
the problem, hazardous waste generators. In order to avoid penalizing those states that permit land disposal facilities to operate
within their borders, states should receive all the revenue generated from the hazardous waste disposed at facilities within its territory. Congress should require states receiving this money to establish an environmental protection/health safety trust fund. States
should use these financial resources to cover long-term monitoring, regulating, and potential remedial costs. In addition, states
could train local environmental and medical response units to
minimize the potential risks and dangers of these disposal facilities. Congress should also allocate a percentage of these funds to
the state's general budget. This financial incentive will serve to
increase the number of safe, state-of-the-art land disposal facilities
by encouraging the states to 84overcome local NIMBY ("not in my
2
backyard") political pressures.
A national uniform tax equitably balances the competing
national and state interests. The tax places the burdens associated
with hazardous waste disposal where it belongs, on the generators.

281 For a list of treatment and disposal methods, see supra note 109.
282 For example, Alabama has tried three different methods to decrease the importation of out-of-state waste. In addition to the differential fee measure at issue in Chemical

Waste, Alabama has attempted to limit the importation of hazardous waste by instituting a
selective ban on out-of-state hazardous waste and by filing a suit to prevent the cleanup
of a Texas Superfund site. See supra note 132.
283 The federal policy is to cleanup hazardous waste sites in the most efficient and

environmentally sound manner. See supra note 37-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA. Bans and differential fees on out-of-state hazardous waste will lead to
delays in hazardous waste site cleanup and discourage responsible waste management
practices now in place. See, e.g., Controvery Continues, supra note 11; Waste Shipment Bans,

supra note 263.
284 For a discussion of NIMBY, see supra note 11.
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It also ensures that states housing these facilities will not be penalized for permitting these waste disposal centers to operate within
their borders. Finally, the uniform tax prevents states from erecting economic barriers against out-of-state hazardous waste. This
serves the national objective of treating and disposing hazardous
waste in a safe and environmentally sound manner.
Kenneth G. Cole

